Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), (not published yet), Judgement of 31 March 2004
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
YEAR 2004
2004 31 March
General List No. 128
31 March 2004
CASE CONCERNING AVENA AND OTHER MEXICAN NATIONALS (MEXICO v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)
Facts of the case . Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963. * Mexico’s objection to the United States objections to jurisdiction and admissibility . United States objections not presented as preliminary objections -Article 79 of Rules of Court not pertinent in present case. * Jurisdiction of the Court. First United States objection to jurisdiction . Contention that Mexico’s submissions invite the Court to rule on the operation of the United States criminal justice system . Jurisdiction of Court to determine the nature and extent of obligations arising under Vienna Convention .
Enquiry into the conduct of criminal proceedings in United States courts a matter belonging to the merits.
Second United States objection to jurisdiction . Contention that the first submission of Mexico’s Memorial is excluded from the Court’s jurisdiction . Mexico defending an interpretation of the Vienna Convention whereby not only the absence of consular notification but also the arrest, detention, trial and conviction of its nationals were unlawful, failing such notification . Interpretation of Vienna Convention a matter within the Court’s jurisdiction. Third United States objection to jurisdiction . Contention that Mexico’s submissions on remedies go beyond the Court’s jurisdiction . Jurisdiction of Court to consider the question of remedies . Question whether or how far the Court may order the requested remedies a matter belonging to the merits. Fourth United States objection to jurisdiction . Contention that the Court lacks jurisdiction to determine whether or not consular notification is a human right . Question of interpretation of Vienna Convention. * Admissibility of Mexico’s claims. First United States objection to admissibility . Contention that Mexico’s submissions on remedies seek to have the Court function as a court of criminal appeal . Question belonging to the merits. Second United States objection to admissibility . Contention that Mexico’s claims to exercise its right of diplomatic protection are inadmissible on grounds that local remedies have not been exhausted . Interdependence in the present case of rights of the State and of individual rights . Mexico requesting the Court to rule on the violation of rights which it suffered both directly and through the violation of individual rights of its nationals . Duty to exhaust local remedies does not apply to such a request. Third United States objection to admissibility . Contention that certain Mexican nationals also have United States nationality . Question belonging to the merits. Fourth United States objection to admissibility . Contention that Mexico had actual knowledge of a breach but failed to bring such breach to the attention of the United States or did so only after considerable delay . No contention in the present case of any prejudice caused by such delay . No implied waiver by Mexico of its rights. Fifth United States objection to admissibility . Contention that Mexico invokes standards that it does not follow in its own practice . Nature of Vienna Convention precludes such an argument. * *
Article 36, paragraph 1 . Mexican nationality of 52 individuals concerned . United States has not proved its contention that some were also United States nationals. Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) . Consular information . Duty to provide consular information as soon as arresting authorities realize that arrested person is a foreign national, or have grounds for so believing . Provision of consular information in parallel with reading of ìMiranda rightsî . Contention that seven individuals stated at the time of arrest that they were United States nationals . Interpretation of phrase ìwithout delayî . Violation by United States of the obligation to provide consular information in 51 cases. Consular notification . Violation by United States of the obligation of consular notification in 49 cases. Article 36, paragraph 1 (a) and (c) . Interrelated nature of the three subparagraphs of paragraph 1 . Violation by United States of the obligation to enable Mexican consular officers to communicate with, have access to and visit their nationals in 49 cases . Violation by United States of the obligation to enable Mexican consular officers to arrange for legal representation of their nationals in 34 cases. Article 36, paragraph 2 . ìProcedural defaultî rule . Possibility of judicial remedies still open in 49 cases . Violation by United States of its obligations under Article 36, paragraph 2, in three cases. * Legal consequences of the breach. Question of adequate reparation for violations of Article 36 . Review and reconsideration by United States courts of convictions and sentences of the Mexican nationals . Choice of means left to United States . Review and reconsideration to be carried out by taking account of violation of Vienna Convention rights . ìProcedural defaultî rule. Judicial process suited to the task of review and reconsideration . Clemency process, as currently practised within the United States criminal justice system, not sufficient in itself to serve as appropriate means of ìreview and reconsiderationî . Appropriate clemency procedures can supplement judicial review and reconsideration.
Mexico requesting cessation of wrongful acts and guarantees and assurances of non-repetition . No evidence to establish ìregular and continuingî pattern of breaches by United States of Article 36 of Vienna Convention . Measures taken by United States to comply with its obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1 . Commitment undertaken by United States to ensure implementation of its obligations under that provision. * No a contrario argument can be made in respect of the Court’s findings in the present Judgment concerning Mexican nationals. * United States obligations declared in Judgment replace those arising from Provisional Measures Order of 5 February 2003 . In the three cases where the United States violated its obligations under Article 36, paragraph 2, it must find an appropriate remedy having the nature of review and reconsideration according to the criteria indicated in the Judgment. JUDGMENT Present: President SHI; Vice-President RANJEVA; Judges GUILLAUME, KOROMA VERESHCHETIN, HIGGINS, PARRA-ARANGUREN, KOOIJMANS, REZEK AL-KHASAWNEH, BUERGENTHAL, ELARABY, OWADA, TOMKA;
Judge ad hoc SEP?LVEDA; Registrar COUVREUR.
In the case concerning Avena and other Mexican nationals between the United Mexican States represented b H.E. Mr. Juan Manuel GÛmez-Robledo, Ambassador, former Legal Adviser, Ministry o Foreign Affairs, Mexico City as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Santiago OÒate, Ambassador of Mexico to the Kingdom of the Netherlands as Agent (until 12 February 2004);
Mr. Arturo A. Dager, Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexico City Ms MarÌa del Refugio Gonz·lez DomÌnguez, Chief, Legal Co-ordination Unit, Ministry o Foreign Affairs, Mexico City as Agents (from 2 March 2004);
H.E. Ms Sandra Fuentes Berain, Ambassador-Designate of Mexico to the Kingdom of th Netherlands as Agent (from 17 March 2004);
Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Professor of Public International Law at the University of Paris I (PanthÈon-Assas) and at the European University Institute, Florence Mr. Donald Francis Donovan, Attorney at Law, Debevoise & Plimpton, New York Ms Sandra L. Babcock, Attorney at Law, Director of the Mexican Capital Legal Assistanc Programme Mr. Carlos Bernal, Attorney at Law, Noriega y Escobedo, and Chairman of the Commissio on International Law at the Mexican Bar Association, Mexico City Ms Katherine Birmingham Wilmore, Attorney at Law, Debevoise & Plimpton, London Mr. Dietmar W. Prager, Attorney at Law, Debevoise & Plimpton, New York Ms Socorro Flores Liera, Chief of Staff, Under-Secretariat for Global Affairs and Huma Rights, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexico City Mr. VÌctor Manuel Uribe AviÒa, Head of the International Litigation Section, Lega Adviser’s Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexico City as Counsellors and Advocates;
Mr. Erasmo A. Lara Cabrera, Head of the International Law Section, Legal Adviser’s Office Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexico City Ms Natalie Klein, Attorney at Law, Debevoise & Plimpton, New York Ms Catherine Amirfar, Attorney at Law, Debevoise & Plimpton, New York Mr. Thomas Bollyky, Attorney at Law, Debevoise & Plimpton, New York Ms Cristina Hoss, Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public La and International Law, Heidelberg,
Mr. Mark Warren, International Law Researcher, Ottawa as Advisers;
Mr. Michel L’Enfant, Debevoise & Plimpton, Paris as Assistant and the United States of America represented b The Honourable William H. Taft, IV, Legal Adviser, United States Department of State as Agent;
Mr. James H. Thessin, Principal Deputy Legal Adviser, United States Department of State as Co-Agent;
Ms Catherine W. Brown, Assistant Legal Adviser for Consular Affairs, United State Department of State Mr. D. Stephen Mathias, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, United State Department of State Mr. Patrick F. Philbin, Associate Deputy Attorney General, United States Department o Justice Mr. John Byron Sandage, Attorney-Adviser for United Nations Affairs, United State Department of State Mr. Thomas Weigend, Professor of Law and Director of the Institute of Foreign an International Criminal Law, University of Cologne Ms Elisabeth Zoller, Professor of Public Law, University of Paris II (PanthÈon-Assas) as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Jacob Katz Cogan, Attorney-Adviser for United Nations Affairs, United State Department of State Ms Sara Criscitelli, Member of the Bar of the State of New York Mr. Robert J. Erickson, Principal Deputy Chief, Criminal Appellate Section, United State Department of Justice,
Mr. Noel J. Francisco, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Unite States Department of Justice Mr. Steven Hill, Attorney-Adviser for Economic and Business Affairs, United State Department of State Mr. Clifton M. Johnson, Legal Counsellor, United States Embassy, The Hague Mr. David A. Kaye, Deputy Legal Counsellor, United States Embassy, The Hague Mr. Peter W. Mason, Attorney-Adviser for Consular Affairs, United States Department o State as Counsel;
Ms Barbara Barrett-Spencer, United States Department of State Ms Marianne Hata, United States Department of State Ms Cecile Jouglet, United States Embassy, Paris Ms Joanne Nelligan, United States Department of State Ms Laura Romains, United States Embassy, The Hague as Administrative Staff THE COURT composed as above after deliberation delivers the following Judgment: 1. On 9 January 2003 the United Mexican States (hereinafter referred to as ìMexicoî) file in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against the United States o America (hereinafter referred to as the ìUnited Statesî) for ìviolations of the Vienna Conventio on Consular Relationsî of 24 April 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the ìVienna Conventionî allegedly committed by the United States.
In its Application, Mexico based the jurisdiction of the Court on Article 36, paragraph 1, o the Statute of the Court and on Article I of the Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsor Settlement of Disputes, which accompanies the Vienna Convention (hereinafter referred to as th ìOptional Protocolî).
2. Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Application was forthwit communicated to the Government of the United States; and, in accordance with paragraph 3 of tha Article, all States entitled to appear before the Court were notified of the Application.
3. On 9 January 2003, the day on which the Application was filed, the Mexican Governmen also filed in the Registry of the Court a request for the indication of provisional measures based o Article 41 of the Statute and Articles 73, 74 and 75 of the Rules of Court.
By an Order of 5 February 2003, the Court indicated the following provisional measures:
ì (a) The United States of America shall take all measures necessary to ensure tha Mr. CÈsar Roberto Fierro Reyna, Mr. Roberto Moreno Ramos and Mr. Osvald Torres Aguilera are not executed pending final judgment in these proceedings;
(b) The Government of the United States of America shall inform the Court of al measures taken in implementation of this Order. It further decided that, ìuntil the Court has rendered its final judgment, it shall remain seised of th mattersî which formed the subject of that Order.
In a letter of 2 November 2003, the Agent of the United States advised the Court that th United States had ìinformed the relevant state authorities of Mexico’s applicationî; that, since th Order of 5 February 2003, the United States had ìobtained from them information about the statu of the fifty-four cases, including the three cases identified in paragraph 59 (I) (a) of that Orderî;
and that the United States could ìconfirm that none of the named individuals [had] been executedî.
4. In accordance with Article 43 of the Rules of Court, the Registrar sent the notificatio referred to in Article 63, paragraph 1, of the Statute to all States parties to the Vienna Conventio or to that Convention and the Optional Protocol.
5. By an Order of 5 February 2003, the Court, taking account of the views of the Parties fixed 6 June 2003 and 6 October 2003, respectively, as the time-limits for the filing of a Memoria by Mexico and of a Counter-Memorial by the United States.
6. By an Order of 22 May 2003, the President of the Court, on the joint request of the Agent of the two Parties, extended to 20 June 2003 the time-limit for the filing of the Memorial; th time-limit for the filing of the Counter-Memorial was extended, by the same Order, t 3 November 2003.
By a letter dated 20 June 2003 and received in the Registry on the same day, the Agent o Mexico informed the Court that Mexico was unable for technical reasons to file the original of it Memorial on time and accordingly asked the Court to decide, under Article 44, paragraph 3, of th Rules of Court, that the filing of the Memorial after the expiration of the time-limit fixed therefo would be considered as valid; that letter was accompanied by two electronic copies of th Memorial and its annexes. Mexico having filed the original of the Memorial on 23 June 2003 an the United States having informed the Court, by a letter of 24 June 2003, that it had no comment t make on the matter, the Court decided on 25 June 2003 that the filing would be considered as valid.
7. In a letter of 14 October 2003, the Agent of Mexico expressed his Government’s wish t amend its submissions in order to include therein the cases of two Mexican nationals Mr. VÌctor Miranda Guerrero and Mr. Tonatihu Aguilar Saucedo, who had been sentenced to death after the filing of Mexico’s Memorial, as a result of criminal proceedings in which, according t Mexico, the United States had failed to comply with its obligations under Article 36 of the Vienn Convention.
In a letter of 2 November 2003, under cover of which the United States filed it Counter-Memorial within the time-limit prescribed, the Agent of the United States informed th Court that his Government objected to the amendment of Mexico’s submissions, on the ground that the request was late, that Mexico had submitted no evidence concerning the alleged facts an that there was not enough time for the United States to investigate them.
In a letter received in the Registry on 28 November 2003, Mexico responded to the Unite States objection and at the same time amended its submissions so as to withdraw its request fo relief in the cases of two Mexican nationals mentioned in the Memorial Mr. Enrique Zambrano Garibi and Mr. Pedro Hern·ndez Alberto, having come to the conclusio that the former had dual Mexican and United States nationality and that the latter had bee informed of his right of consular notification prior to interrogation.
On 9 December 2003, the Registrar informed Mexico and the United States that, in order t ensure the procedural equality of the Parties, the Court had decided not to authorize the amendmen of Mexico’s submissions so as to include the two additional Mexican nationals mentioned above.
He also informed the Parties that the Court had taken note that the United States had made n objection to the withdrawal by Mexico of its request for relief in the cases of Mr. Zambrano an Mr. Hern·ndez.
8. On 28 November 2003 and 2 December 2003, Mexico filed various documents which i wished to produce in accordance with Article 56 of the Rules of Court. By letters date 2 December 2003 and 5 December 2003, the Agent of the United States informed the Court that hi Government did not object to the production of these new documents and that it intended t exercise its right to comment upon these documents and to submit documents in support of it comments, pursuant to paragraph 3 of that Article. By letters dated 9 December 2003, th Registrar informed the Parties that the Court had taken note that the United States had no objectio to the production of these documents and that accordingly counsel would be free to refer to them i the course of the hearings. On 10 December 2003, the Agent of the United States filed th comments of his Government on the new documents produced by Mexico, together with a numbe of documents in support of those comments.
9. Since the Court included upon the Bench no judge of Mexican nationality, Mexico availe itself of its right under Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Statute to choose a judge ad hoc to sit in th case: it chose Mr. Bernardo Sep?lveda.
10. Pursuant to Article 53, paragraph 2, of its Rules, the Court, having consulted the Parties decided that copies of the pleadings and documents annexed would be made accessible to th public on the opening of the oral proceedings.
11. Public sittings were held between 15 and 19 December 2003, at which the Court hear the oral arguments and replies of:
For Mexico: H.E. Mr. Juan Manuel GÛmez-Robledo Ms Sandra L. Babcock Mr. VÌctor Manuel Uribe AviÒa Mr. Donald Francis Donovan Ms Katherine Birmingham Wilmore H.E. Mr. Santiago OÒate Ms Socorro Flores Liera Mr. Carlos Bernal Mr. Dietmar W. Prager Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy.
For the United States: The Honourable William H. Taft, IV Ms Elisabeth Zoller Mr. Patrick F. Philbin Mr. John Byron Sandage Ms Catherine W. Brown Mr. D. Stephen Mathias Mr. James H. Thessin Mr. Thomas Weigend.
12. In its Application, Mexico formulated the decision requested in the following terms:
ìThe Government of the United Mexican States therefore asks the Court t adjudge and declare:
(1) that the United States, in arresting, detaining, trying, convicting, and sentencin the 54 Mexican nationals on death row described in this Application, violated it international legal obligations to Mexico, in its own right and in the exercise of it right of consular protection of its nationals, as provided by Articles 5 and 36 respectively of the Vienna Convention;
(2) that Mexico is therefore entitled to restitutio in integrum ;
(3) that the United States is under an international legal obligation not to apply th doctrine of procedural default, or any other doctrine of its municipal law, t preclude the exercise of the rights afforded by Article 36 of the Vienn Convention;
(4) that the United States is under an international legal obligation to carry out i conformity with the foregoing international legal obligations any future detentio of or criminal proceedings against the 54 Mexican nationals on death row or an other Mexican national in its territory, whether by a constituent, legislative executive, judicial or other power, whether that power holds a superior or subordinate position in the organization of the United States, and whether tha power’s functions are international or internal in character;
(5) that the right to consular notification under the Vienna Convention is a huma right;
and that, pursuant to the foregoing international legal obligations (1) the United States must restore the status quo ante , that is, re-establish the situatio that existed before the detention of, proceedings against, and convictions an sentences of, Mexico’s nationals in violation of the United States internationa legal obligations;
(2) the United States must take the steps necessary and sufficient to ensure that th provisions of its municipal law enable full effect to be given to the purposes fo which the rights afforded by Article 36 are intended;
(3) the United States must take the steps necessary and sufficient to establish meaningful remedy at law for violations of the rights afforded to Mexico and it nationals by Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, including by barring th imposition, as a matter of municipal law, of any procedural penalty for the failur timely to raise a claim or defence based on the Vienna Convention wher competent authorities of the United States have breached their obligation to advis the national of his or her rights under the Convention; an (4) the United States, in light of the pattern and practice of violations set forth in thi Application, must provide Mexico a full guarantee of the non-repetition of th illegal acts. 13. In the course of the written proceedings, the following submissions were presented b the Parties:
On behalf of the Government of Mexico in the Memorial:
ìFor these reasons, . . . the Government of Mexico respectfully requests th Court to adjudge and declar (1) that the United States, in arresting, detaining, trying, convicting, and sentencin the fifty-four Mexican nationals on death row described in Mexico’s Applicatio and this Memorial, violated its international legal obligations to Mexico, in its ow right and in the exercise of its right of diplomatic protection of its nationals, a provided by Article 36 of the Vienna Convention;
(2) that the obligation in Article 36 (1) of the Vienna Convention requires notificatio before the competent authorities of the receiving State interrogate the foreig national or take any other action potentially detrimental to his or her rights;
(3) that the United States, in applying the doctrine of procedural default, or any othe doctrine of its municipal law, to preclude the exercise and review of the right afforded by Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, violated its international lega obligations to Mexico, in its own right and in the exercise of its right of diplomati protection of its nationals, as provided by Article 36 of the Vienna Convention;
an (4) that the United States is under an international legal obligation to carry out i conformity with the foregoing international legal obligations any future detentio of or criminal proceedings against the fifty-four Mexican nationals on death ro and any other Mexican national in its territory, whether by a constituent legislative, executive, judicial or other power, whether that power holds a superio or a subordinate position in the organization of the United States, and whether tha power’s functions are international or internal in character;
and that, pursuant to the foregoing international legal obligations (1) Mexico is entitled to restitutio in integrum and the United States therefore is unde an obligation to restore the status quo ante , that is, reestablish the situation tha existed at the time of the detention and prior to the interrogation of, proceeding against, and convictions and sentences of, Mexico’s nationals in violation of th United States’ international legal obligations, specifically by, among other things (a) vacating the convictions of the fifty-four Mexican nationals;
(b) vacating the sentences of the fifty-four Mexican nationals;
(c) excluding any subsequent proceedings against the fifty-four Mexican national any statements and confessions obtained from them prior to notification o their rights to consular notification and access;
(d) preventing the application of any procedural penalty for a Mexican national’ failure timely to raise a claim or defense based on the Vienna Conventio where competent authorities of the United States have breached thei obligation to advise the national of his rights under the Convention;
(e) preventing the application of any municipal law doctrine or judicial holdin that prevents a court in the United States from providing a remedy, includin the relief to which this Court holds that Mexico is entitled here, to a Mexica national whose Article 36 rights have been violated; an (f) preventing the application of any municipal law doctrine or judicial holdin that requires an individualized showing of prejudice as a prerequisite to relie for the violations of Article 36;
(2) the United States, in light of the regular and continuous violations set forth i Mexico’s Application and Memorial, is under an obligation to take all legislative executive, and judicial steps necessary to:
(a) ensure that the regular and continuing violations of the Article 36 consula notification, access, and assistance rights of Mexico and its nationals cease;
(b) guarantee that its competent authorities, of federal, state, and local jurisdiction maintain regular and routine compliance with their Article 36 obligations;
(c) ensure that its judicial authorities cease applying, and guarantee that in th future they will not apply:
(i) any procedural penalty for a Mexican national’s failure timely to raise claim or defense based on the Vienna Convention where competen authorities of the United States have breached their obligation to advis the national of his or her rights under the Convention;
(ii) any municipal law doctrine or judicial holding that prevents a court i the United States from providing a remedy, including the relief to whic this Court holds that Mexico is entitled here, to a Mexican nationa whose Article 36 rights have been violated; and
(iii) any municipal law doctrine or judicial holding that requires a individualized showing of prejudice as a prerequisite to relief for th Vienna Convention violations shown here. On behalf of the Government of the United States in the Counter-Memorial:
ìOn the basis of the facts and arguments set out above, the Government of th United States of America requests that the Court adjudge and declare that the claim of the United Mexican States are dismissed. 14. At the oral proceedings, the following submissions were presented by the Parties:
On behalf of the Government of Mexico ìThe Government of Mexico respectfully requests the Court to adjudge an declar (1) That the United States of America, in arresting, detaining, trying, convicting, an sentencing the 52 Mexican nationals on death row described in Mexico’ Memorial, violated its international legal obligations to Mexico, in its own righ and in the exercise of its right to diplomatic protection of its nationals, by failin to inform, without delay, the 52 Mexican nationals after their arrest of their righ to consular notification and access under Article 36 (1) (b) of the Vienn Convention on Consular Relations, and by depriving Mexico of its right to provid consular protection and the 52 nationals’ right to receive such protection a Mexico would provide under Article 36 (1) (a) and (c) of the Convention;
(2) That the obligation in Article 36 (1) of the Vienna Convention require notification of consular rights and a reasonable opportunity for consular acces before the competent authorities of the receiving State take any action potentiall detrimental to the foreign national’s rights;
(3) That the United States of America violated its obligations under Article 36 (2) o the Vienna Convention by failing to provide meaningful and effective review an reconsideration of convictions and sentences impaired by a violation o Article 36 (1); by substituting for such review and reconsideration clemenc proceedings; and by applying the ìprocedural defaultî doctrine and othe municipal law doctrines that fail to attach legal significance to an Article 36 (1 violation on its own terms;
(4) That pursuant to the injuries suffered by Mexico in its own right and in th exercise of diplomatic protection of its nationals, Mexico is entitled to ful reparation for those injuries in the form of restitutio in integrum ;
(5) That this restitution consists of the obligation to restore the status quo ante b annulling or otherwise depriving of full force or effect the convictions an sentences of all 52 Mexican nationals;
(6) That this restitution also includes the obligation to take all measures necessary t ensure that a prior violation of Article 36 shall not affect the subsequen proceedings;
(7) That to the extent that any of the 52 convictions or sentences are not annulled, th United States shall provide, by means of its own choosing, meaningful an effective review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of the 5 nationals, and that this obligation cannot be satisfied by means of clemenc proceedings or if any municipal law rule or doctrine inconsistent wit paragraph (3) above is applied; an (8) That the United States of America shall cease its violations of Article 36 of th Vienna Convention with regard to Mexico and its 52 nationals and shall provid appropriate guarantees and assurances that it shall take measures sufficient t achieve increased compliance with Article 36 (1) and to ensure compliance wit Article 36 (2). On behalf of the Government of the United States ìOn the basis of the facts and arguments made by the United States in it Counter-Memorial and in these proceedings, the Government of the United States o America requests that the Court, taking into account that the United States ha conformed its conduct to this Court’s Judgment in the LaGrand Case (Germany v.
United States of America) , not only with respect to German nationals but, consisten with the Declaration of the President of the Court in that case, to all detained foreig nationals, adjudge and declare that the claims of the United Mexican States ar dismissed. * 15. The present proceedings have been brought by Mexico against the United States on th basis of the Vienna Convention, and of the Optional Protocol providing for the jurisdiction of th Court over ìdisputes arising out of the interpretation or applicationî of the Convention. Mexico
and the United States are, and were at all relevant times, parties to the Vienna Convention and t the Optional Protocol. Mexico claims that the United States has committed breaches of the Vienn Convention in relation to the treatment of a number of Mexican nationals who have been tried convicted and sentenced to death in criminal proceedings in the United States. The original clai related to 54 such persons, but as a result of subsequent adjustments to its claim made by Mexic (see paragraph 7 above), only 52 individual cases are involved. These criminal proceedings hav been taking place in nine different States of the United States, namely California (28 cases), Texa (15 cases), Illinois (three cases), Arizona (one case), Arkansas (one case), Nevada (one case), Ohi (one case), Oklahoma (one case) and Oregon (one case), between 1979 and the present.
16. For convenience, the names of the 52 individuals, and the numbers by which their case will be referred to, are set out below:
1. Carlos Avena Guille 2. HÈctor Juan Ayal 3. Vicente Benavides Figuero 4. Constantino Carrera Montenegr 5. Jorge Contreras LÛpe 6. Daniel Covarrubias S·nche 7. Marcos Esquivel Barrer 8. RubÈn GÛmez PÈre 9. Jaime Armando Hoyo 10. Arturo Ju·rez Su·re 11. Juan Manuel LÛpe 12. JosÈ Lupercio Casare 13. Luis Alberto Maciel Hern·nde 14. Abelino ManrÌquez J·que 15. Omar Fuentes MartÌnez (a.k.a. Luis Aviles de la Cruz 16. Miguel Angel MartÌnez S·nche 17. MartÌn Mendoza GarcÌ 18. Sergio Ochoa Tamay 19. Enrique Parra DueÒa 20. Juan de Dios RamÌrez Vill 21. Magdaleno Salaza 22. RamÛn Salcido BojÛrque 23. Juan RamÛn S·nchez RamÌre 24. Ignacio Tafoya Arriol 25. Alfredo Valdez Reye 26. Eduardo David Varga 27. Tom·s Verano Cru 28. [Case withdrawn 29. Samuel Zamudio JimÈne 30. Juan Carlos Alvarez Band 31. CÈsar Roberto Fierro Reyn 32. HÈctor GarcÌa Torres
33. Ignacio GÛme 34. Ramiro Hern·ndez Llana 35. Ramiro RubÌ Ibarr 36. Humberto Leal GarcÌ 37. Virgilio Maldonad 38. JosÈ Ernesto MedellÌn Roja 39. Roberto Moreno Ramo 40. Daniel Angel Plata Estrad 41. RubÈn RamÌrez C·rdena 42. FÈlix Rocha DÌa 43. Oswaldo Regalado Sorian 44. Edgar Arias Tamay 45. Juan Caballero Hern·nde 46. Mario Flores Urb· 47. Gabriel Solache Romer 48. MartÌn Ra?l Fong Sot 49. Rafael Camargo Ojed 50. [Case withdrawn 51. Carlos RenÈ PÈrez GutiÈrre 52. JosÈ Trinidad Loz 53. Osvaldo NetzahualcÛyotl Torres Aguiler 54. Horacio Alberto Reyes Camaren 17. The provisions of the Vienna Convention of which Mexico alleges violations ar contained in Article 36. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article are set out respectively in paragraphs 5 and 108 below. Article 36 relates, according to its title, to ìCommunication and contact wit nationals of the sending Stateî. Paragraph 1 (b) of that Article provides that if a national of tha State ìis arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any othe mannerî, and he so requests, the local consular post of the sending State is to be notified. Th Article goes on to provide that the ìcompetent authorities of the receiving Stateî shall ìinform th person concerned without delay of his rightsî in this respect. Mexico claims that in the presen case these provisions were not complied with by the United States authorities in respect of th 52 Mexican nationals the subject of its claims. As a result, the United States has according t Mexico committed breaches of paragraph 1 (b) ; moreover, Mexico claims, for reasons to b explained below (see paragraphs 98 et seq. ), that the United States is also in breach o paragraph 1 (a) and (c) and of paragraph 2 of Article 36, in view of the relationship of thes provisions with paragraph 1 (b) .
18. As regards the terminology employed to designate the obligations incumbent upon th receiving State under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , the Court notes that the Parties have used th terms ìinformî and ìnotifyî in differing senses. For the sake of clarity, the Court, when speakin in its own name in the present Judgment, will use the word ìinformî when referring to a individual being made aware of his rights under that subparagraph and the word ìnotifyî whe referring to the giving of notice to the consular post.
19. The underlying facts alleged by Mexico may be briefly described as follows: some ar conceded by the United States, and some disputed. Mexico states that all the individuals th subject of its claims were Mexican nationals at the time of their arrest. It further contends that th United States authorities that arrested and interrogated these individuals had sufficient informatio at their disposal to be aware of the foreign nationality of those individuals. According to Mexico’ account, in 50 of the specified cases, Mexican nationals were never informed by the competen United States authorities of their rights under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , of the Vienna Conventio and, in the two remaining cases, such information was not provided ìwithout delayî, as required b that provision. Mexico has indicated that in 29 of the 52 cases its consular authorities learned o the detention of the Mexican nationals only after death sentences had been handed down. In th 23 remaining cases, Mexico contends that it learned of the cases through means other tha notification to the consular post by the competent United States authorities under Article 36 paragraph 1 (b) . It explains that in five cases this was too late to affect the trials, that in 15 case the defendants had already made incriminating statements, and that it became aware of the othe three cases only after considerable delay.
20. Of the 52 cases referred to in Mexico’s final submissions, 49 are currently at differen stages of the proceedings before United States judicial authorities at state or federal level, and i three cases, those of Mr. Fierro (case No. 31), Mr. Moreno (case No. 39) and Mr. Torres (cas No. 53), judicial remedies within the United States have already been exhausted. The Court ha been informed of the variety of types of proceedings and forms of relief available in the crimina justice systems of the United States, which can differ from state to state. In very general terms, an according to the description offered by both Parties in their pleadings, it appears that the 52 case may be classified into three categories: 24 cases which are currently in direct appeal; 25 cases i which means of direct appeal have been exhausted, but post-conviction relief (habeas corpus) either at State or at federal level, is still available; and three cases in which no judicial remedie remain. The Court also notes that, in at least 33 cases, the alleged breach of the Vienna Conventio was raised by the defendant either during pre-trial, at trial, on appeal or in habeas corpus proceedings, and that some of these claims were dismissed on procedural or substantive ground and others are still pending. To date, in none of the 52 cases have the defendants had recourse t the clemency process.
21. On 9 January 2003, the day on which Mexico filed its Application and a request for th indication of provisional measures, all 52 individuals the subject of the claims were on death row.
However, two days later the Governor of the State of Illinois, exercising his power of clemenc review, commuted the sentences of all convicted individuals awaiting execution in that State including those of three individuals named in Mexico’s Application (Mr. Caballero (case No. 45) Mr. Flores (case No. 46) and Mr. Solache (case No. 47)). By a letter dated 20 January 2003 Mexico informed the Court that, further to that decision, it withdrew its request for the indication o provisional measures on behalf of these three individuals, but that its Application remaine unchanged. In the Order of 5 February 2003, mentioned in paragraph 3 above, on the request b Mexico for the indication of provisional measures, the Court considered that it was apparent from
the information before it that the three Mexican nationals named in the Application who ha exhausted all judicial remedies in the United States (see paragraph 20 above) were at risk o execution in the following months, or even weeks. Consequently, it ordered by way of provisiona measure that the United States take all measures necessary to ensure that these individuals woul not be executed pending final judgment in these proceedings. The Court notes that, at the date o the present Judgment, these three individuals have not been executed, but further notes with grea concern that, by an Order dated 1 March 2004, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has set a execution date of 18 May 2004 for Mr. Torres.
* The Mexican objection to the United States objections to jurisdiction and admissibility 22. As noted above, the present dispute has been brought before the Court by Mexico on th basis of the Vienna Convention and the Optional Protocol to that Convention. Article I of th Optional Protocol provides:
ìDisputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the [Vienna Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court o Justice and may accordingly be brought before the Court by a written applicatio made by any party to the dispute being a Party to the present Protocol. 23. The United States has presented a number of objections to the jurisdiction of the Court as well as a number of objections to the admissibility of the claims advanced by Mexico. It i however the contention of Mexico that all the objections raised by the United States ar inadmissible as having been raised after the expiration of the time-limit laid down by the Rules o Court. Mexico draws attention to the text of Article 79, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court a amended in 2000, which provides tha ìAny objection by the respondent to the jurisdiction of the Court or to th admissibility of the application, or other objection the decision upon which i requested before any further proceedings on the merits, shall be made in writing a soon as possible, and not later than three months after the delivery of the Memorial. The previous text of this paragraph required objections to be made ìwithin the time-limit fixed fo delivery of the Counter-Memorialî. In the present case the Memorial of Mexico was filed o 23 June 2003; the objections of the United States to jurisdiction and admissibility were presente in its Counter-Memorial, filed on 3 November 2003, more than four months later.
24. The United States has observed that, during the proceedings on the request made b Mexico for the indication of provisional measures in this case, it specifically reserved its right t make jurisdictional arguments at the appropriate stage, and that subsequently the Parties agreed tha there should be a single round of pleadings. The Court would however emphasize that parties t cases before it cannot, by purporting to ìreserve their rightsî to take some procedural action exempt themselves from the application to such action of the provisions of the Statute and Rules o Court (cf. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Order of 13 September 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993 , p. 338, para. 28).
The Court notes, however, that Article 79 of the Rules applies only to preliminar objections, as is indicated by the title of the subsection of the Rules which it constitutes. As th Court observed in the Lockerbie cases, ìif it is to be covered by Article 79, an objection must . . .
possess a ëpreliminary’ character,î and ìParagraph 1 of Article 79 of the Rules of Cour characterizes as ëpreliminary’ an objection ëthe decision upon which is requested before any furthe proceedings’î ( Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom) (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1998 , p. 26, para. 47; p. 131, para. 46); and the effect of the timely presentation of such a objection is that the proceedings on the merits are suspended (paragraph 5 of Article 79). A objection that is not presented as a preliminary objection in accordance with paragraph 1 o Article 79 does not thereby become inadmissible. There are of course circumstances in which th party failing to put forward an objection to jurisdiction might be held to have acquiesced i jurisdiction ( Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1972 , p. 52, para. 13). However, apart from such circumstances, a party failing to avail itself of th Article 79 procedure may forfeit the right to bring about a suspension of the proceedings on th merits, but can still argue the objection along with the merits. That is indeed what the Unite States has done in this case; and, for reasons to be indicated below, many of its objections are o such a nature that they would in any event probably have had to be heard along with the merits.
The Court concludes that it should not exclude from consideration the objections of the Unite States to jurisdiction and admissibility by reason of the fact that they were not presented withi three months from the date of filing of the Memorial.
25. The United States has submitted four objections to the jurisdiction of the Court, and fiv to the admissibility of the claims of Mexico. As noted above, these have not been submitted a preliminary objections under Article 79 of the Rules of Court; and they are not of such a natur that the Court would be required to examine and dispose of all of them in limine , before dealin with any aspect of the merits of the case. Some are expressed to be only addressed to certai claims; some are addressed to questions of the remedies to be indicated if the Court finds tha breaches of the Vienna Convention have been committed; and some are of such a nature that the would have to be dealt with along with the merits. The Court will however now examine each o them in turn.
* *
United States objections to jurisdiction 26. The United States contends that the Court lacks jurisdiction to decide many of Mexico’ claims, inasmuch as Mexico’s submissions in the Memorial asked the Court to decide question which do not arise out of the interpretation or application of the Vienna Convention, and which th United States has never agreed to submit to the Court.
27. By its first jurisdictional objection, the United States suggested that the Memorial i fundamentally addressed to the treatment of Mexican nationals in the federal and state crimina justice systems of the United States, and the operation of the United States criminal justice syste as a whole. It suggested that Mexico’s invitation to the Court to make what the United State regards as ìfar-reaching and unsustainable findings concerning the United States criminal justic systemsî would be an abuse of the Court’s jurisdiction. At the hearings, the United State contended that Mexico is asking the Court to interpret and apply the treaty as if it were intende principally to govern the operation of a State’s criminal justice system as it affects foreig nationals.
28. The Court would recall that its jurisdiction in the present case has been invoked under th Vienna Convention and Optional Protocol to determine the nature and extent of the obligation undertaken by the United States towards Mexico by becoming party to that Convention. If and s far as the Court may find that the obligations accepted by the parties to the Vienna Conventio included commitments as to the conduct of their municipal courts in relation to the nationals o other parties, then in order to ascertain whether there have been breaches of the Convention, th Court must be able to examine the actions of those courts in the light of international law. Th Court is unable to uphold the contention of the United States that, as a matter of jurisdiction, it i debarred from enquiring into the conduct of criminal proceedings in United States courts. How fa it may do so in the present case is a matter for the merits. The first objection of the United States t jurisdiction cannot therefore be upheld.
29. The second jurisdictional objection presented by the United States was addressed to th first of the submissions presented by Mexico in its Memorial (see paragraph 13 above). Th United States pointed out that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention ìcreates no obligation constraining the rights of the United States to arrest a foreign nationalî; and that similarly the
ìdetaining, trying, convicting and sentencingî of Mexican nationals could not constitute breache of Article 36, which merely lays down obligations of notification. The United States deduced fro this that the matters raised in Mexico’s first submission are outside the jurisdiction of the Cour under the Vienna Convention and the Optional Protocol, and it maintains this objection in respons to the revised submission, presented by Mexico at the hearings, whereby it asks the Court t adjudge and declare:
ìThat the United States of America, in arresting, detaining, trying, convicting and sentencing the 52 Mexican nationals on death row described in Mexico’ Memorial, violated its international legal obligations to Mexico, in its own right and i the exercise of its right to diplomatic protection of its nationals, by failing to inform without delay, the 52 Mexican nationals after their arrest of their right to consula notification and access under Article 36 (1) (b) of the Vienna Convention on Consula Relations, and by depriving Mexico of its right to provide consular protection and th 52 nationals’ right to receive such protection as Mexico would provide unde Article 36 (1) (a) and (c) of the Convention. 30. This issue is a question of interpretation of the obligations imposed by the Vienn Convention. It is true that the only obligation of the receiving State toward a foreign national tha is specifically enunciated by Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , of the Vienna Convention is to infor such foreign national of his rights, when he is ìarrested or committed to prison or to custod pending trial or is detained in any other mannerî; the text does not restrain the receiving State fro ìarresting, detaining, trying, convicting, and sentencingî the foreign national, or limit its power t do so. However, as regards the detention, trial, conviction and sentence of its nationals, Mexic argues that depriving a foreign national facing criminal proceedings of consular notification an assistance renders those proceedings fundamentally unfair. Mexico explains in this respect that:
ìConsular notification constitutes a basic component of due process by ensurin both the procedural equality of a foreign national in the criminal process and th enforcement of other fundamental due process guarantees to which that national i entitledî and that ìIt is therefore an essential requirement for fair criminal proceedings against foreig nationals.î In Mexico’s contention, ìconsular notification has been widely recognized as fundamental due process right, and indeed, a human rightî. On this basis it argues that the rights o the detained Mexican nationals have been violated by the authorities of the United States, and tha those nationals have been ìsubjected to criminal proceedings without the fairness and dignity t which each person is entitledî. Consequently, in the contention of Mexico, ìthe integrity of thes proceedings has been hopelessly undermined, their outcomes rendered irrevocably unjustî. For
Mexico to contend, on this basis, that not merely the failure to notify, but the arrest, detention, tria and conviction of its nationals were unlawful is to argue in favour of a particular interpretation o the Vienna Convention. Such an interpretation may or may not be confirmed on the merits, but i not excluded from the jurisdiction conferred on the Court by the Optional Protocol to the Vienn Convention. The second objection of the United States to jurisdiction cannot therefore be upheld.
31. The third objection by the United States to the jurisdiction of the Court refers to the firs of the submissions in the Mexican Memorial concerning remedies. By that submission, which wa confirmed in substance in the final submissions, Mexico claimed tha ìMexico is entitled to restitutio in integrum , and the United States therefore i under an obligation to restore the status quo ante , that is, reestablish the situation tha existed at the time of the detention and prior to the interrogation of, proceeding against, and convictions and sentences of, Mexico’s nationals in violation of th United States’ international legal obligations . . . On that basis, Mexico went on in its first submission to invite the Court to declare that the Unite States was bound to vacate the convictions and sentences of the Mexican nationals concerned, t exclude from any subsequent proceedings any statements and confessions obtained from them, t prevent the application of any procedural penalty for failure to raise a timely defence on the basi of the Convention, and to prevent the application of any municipal law rule preventing courts in th United States from providing a remedy for the violation of Article 36 rights.
32. The United States objects that so to require specific acts by the United States in it municipal criminal justice systems would intrude deeply into the independence of its courts; an that for the Court to declare that the United States is under a specific obligation to vacat convictions and sentences would be beyond its jurisdiction. The Court, the United States claims has no jurisdiction to review appropriateness of sentences in criminal cases, and even less t determine guilt or innocence, matters which only a court of criminal appeal could go into.
33. For its part, Mexico points out that the United States accepts that the Court ha jurisdiction to interpret the Vienna Convention and to determine the appropriate form of reparatio under international law. In Mexico’s view, these two considerations are sufficient to defeat th third objection to jurisdiction of the United States.
34. For the same reason as in respect of the second jurisdictional objection, the Court i unable to uphold the contention of the United States that, even if the Court were to find tha breaches of the Vienna Convention have been committed by the United States of the kind allege by Mexico, it would still be without jurisdiction to order restitutio in integrum as requested b Mexico. The Court would recall in this regard, as it did in the LaGrand case, that, wher jurisdiction exists over a dispute on a particular matter, no separate basis for jurisdiction is require by the Court in order to consider the remedies a party has requested for the breach of the obligatio ( I.C.J. Reports 2001 , p. 485, para. 48). Whether or how far the Court may order the remed requested by Mexico are matters to be determined as part of the merits of the dispute. The thir objection of the United States to jurisdiction cannot therefore be upheld.
35. The fourth and last jurisdictional objection of the United States is that ìthe Court lack jurisdiction to determine whether or not consular notification is a ëhuman right’, or to declar fundamental requirements of substantive or procedural due processî. As noted above, it is on th basis of Mexico’s contention that the right to consular notification has been widely recognized as fundamental due process right, and indeed a human right, that it argues that the rights of th detained Mexican nationals have been violated by the authorities of the United States, and that the have been ìsubjected to criminal proceedings without the fairness and dignity to which each perso is entitledî. The Court observes that Mexico has presented this argument as being a matter o interpretation of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , and therefore belonging to the merits. The Cour considers that this is indeed a question of interpretation of the Vienna Convention, for which it ha jurisdiction; the fourth objection of the United States to jurisdiction cannot therefore be upheld.
* United States objections to admissibility 36. In its Counter-Memorial, the United States has advanced a number of argument presented as objections to the admissibility of Mexico’s claims. It argues tha ìBefore proceeding, the Court should weigh whether characteristics of the cas before it today, or special circumstances related to particular claims, render either th entire case, or particular claims, inappropriate for further consideration and decisio by the Court. *
37. The first objection under this head is that ìMexico’s submissions should be foun inadmissible because they seek to have this Court function as a court of criminal appealî; there is in the view of the United States, ìno other apt characterization of Mexico’s two submissions i respect of remediesî. The Court notes that this contention is addressed solely to the question o remedies. The United States does not contend on this ground that the Court should declin jurisdiction to enquire into the question of breaches of the Vienna Convention at all, but simpl that, if such breaches are shown, the Court should do no more than decide that the United State must provide ìreview and reconsiderationî along the lines indicated in the Judgment in th LaGrand case ( I.C.J. Reports 2001 , pp. 513-514, para. 125). The Court notes that this is a matte of merits. The first objection of the United States to admissibility cannot therefore be upheld.
38. The Court now turns to the objection of the United States based on the rule of exhaustio of local remedies. The United States contends that the Court ìshould find inadmissible Mexico’ claim to exercise its right of diplomatic protection on behalf of any Mexican national who ha failed to meet the customary legal requirement of exhaustion of municipal remediesî. It assert that in a number of the cases the subject of Mexico’s claims, the detained Mexican national, eve with the benefit of the provision of Mexican consular assistance, failed to raise the allege non-compliance with Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention at the trial. Furthermore it contends that all of the claims relating to cases referred to in the Mexican Memorial ar inadmissible because local remedies remain available in every case. It has drawn attention to th fact that litigation is pending before courts in the United States in a large number of the cases th subject of Mexico’s claims and that, in those cases where judicial remedies have been exhausted the defendants have not had recourse to the clemency process available to them; from this i concludes that none of the cases ìis in an appropriate posture for review by an internationa tribunalî.
39. Mexico responds that the rule of exhaustion of local remedies cannot preclude th admissibility of its claims. It first states that a majority of the Mexican nationals referred to i paragraph 16 above have sought judicial remedies in the United States based on the Vienn Convention and that their claims have been barred, notably on the basis of the procedural defaul doctrine. In this regard, it quotes the Court’s statement in the LaGrand case that ìthe United State may not . . . rely before this Court on this fact in order to preclude the admissibility of Germany’ [claim] . . ., as it was the United States itself which had failed to carry out its obligation under th Convention to inform the LaGrand brothersî ( I.C.J. Reports 2001 , p. 488, para. 60). Further, i respect of the other Mexican nationals, Mexico asserts that
ìthe courts of the United States have never granted a judicial remedy to any foreig national for a violation of Article 36. The United States courts hold either tha Article 36 does not create an individual right, or that a foreign national who has bee denied his Article 36 rights but given his constitutional and statutory rights, canno establish prejudice and therefore cannot get relief. It concludes that the available judicial remedies are thus ineffective. As for clemency procedures Mexico contends that they cannot count for purposes of the rule of exhaustion of local remedies because they are not a judicial remedy.
40. In its final submissions Mexico asks the Court to adjudge and declare that the Unite States, in failing to comply with Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention, has ìviolate its international legal obligations to Mexico, in its own right and in the exercise of its right o diplomatic protection of its nationalsî.
The Court would first observe that the individual rights of Mexican nationals unde subparagraph 1 (b) of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention are rights which are to be asserted, a any rate in the first place, within the domestic legal system of the United States. Only when tha process is completed and local remedies are exhausted would Mexico be entitled to espouse th individual claims of its nationals through the procedure of diplomatic protection.
In the present case Mexico does not, however, claim to be acting solely on that basis. It als asserts its own claims, basing them on the injury which it contends that it has itself suffered, directly and through its nationals , as a result of the violation by the United States of the obligation incumbent upon it under Article 36, paragraph 1 (a) , (b) and (c) .
The Court would recall that, in the LaGrand case, it recognized that ìArticle 36, paragraph [of the Vienna Convention], creates individual rights [for the national concerned], which . . . ma be invoked in this Court by the national State of the detained personî ( I.C.J. Reports 2001 , p. 494 para. 77). It would further observe that violations of the rights of the individual under Article 3 may entail a violation of the rights of the sending State, and that violations of the rights of the latte may entail a violation of the rights of the individual. In these special circumstances o interdependence of the rights of the State and of individual rights, Mexico may, in submitting claim in its own name, request the Court to rule on the violation of rights which it claims to hav suffered both directly and through the violation of individual rights conferred on Mexican national under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) . The duty to exhaust local remedies does not apply to such request. Further, for reasons just explained, the Court does not find it necessary to deal wit Mexico’s claims of violation under a distinct heading of diplomatic protection. Without needing t pronounce at this juncture on the issues raised by the procedural default rule, as explained b Mexico in paragraph 39 above, the Court accordingly finds that the second objection by the Unite States to admissibility cannot be upheld.
*
41. The Court now turns to the question of the alleged dual nationality of certain of th Mexican nationals the subject of Mexico’s claims. This question is raised by the United States b way of an objection to the admissibility of those claims: the United States contends that in it Memorial Mexico had failed to establish that it may exercise diplomatic protection based o breaches of Mexico’s rights under the Vienna Convention with respect to those of its nationals wh are also nationals of the United States. The United States regards it as an accepted principle that when a person arrested or detained in the receiving State is a national of that State, then even if h is also a national of another State party to the Vienna Convention, Article 36 has no application and the authorities of the receiving State are not required to proceed as laid down in that Article;
and Mexico has indicated that, for the purposes of the present case it does not contest that dua nationals have no right to be advised of their rights under Article 36.
42. It has however to be recalled that Mexico, in addition to seeking to exercise diplomati protection of its nationals, is making a claim in its own right on the basis of the alleged breaches b the United States of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. Seen from this standpoint, the questio of dual nationality is not one of admissibility, but of merits. A claim may be made by Mexico o breach of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention in relation to any of its nationals, and the Unite States is thereupon free to show that, because the person concerned was also a United State national, Article 36 had no application to that person, so that no breach of treaty obligations coul have occurred. Furthermore, as regards the claim to exercise diplomatic protection, the questio whether Mexico is entitled to protect a person having dual Mexican and United States nationality i subordinated to the question whether, in relation to such a person, the United States was under an obligation in terms of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. It is thus in the course of it examination of the merits that the Court will have to consider whether the individuals concerned, o some of them, were dual nationals in law. Without prejudice to the outcome of such examination the third objection of the United States to admissibility cannot therefore be upheld.
43. The Court now turns to the fourth objection advanced by the United States to th admissibility of Mexico’s claims: the contention that ìThe Court should not permit Mexico t pursue a claim against the United States with respect to any individual case where Mexico ha actual knowledge of a breach of the [Vienna Convention] but failed to bring such breach to th attention of the United States or did so only after considerable delay.î In the Counter-Memorial the United States advances two considerations in support of this contention: that if the cases ha been mentioned promptly, corrective action might have been possible; and that by inaction Mexic created an impression that it considered that the United States was meeting its obligations under th Convention, as Mexico understood them. At the hearings, the United States suggested that Mexic had in effect waived its right to claim in respect of the alleged breaches of the Convention, and t seek reparation.
44. As the Court observed in the case of Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v.
Australia) , ìdelay on the part of a claimant State may render an application inadmissibleî, bu ìinternational law does not lay down any specific time-limit in that regardî ( I.C.J. Reports 1992 pp. 253-254, para. 32). In that case the Court recognized that delay might prejudice the responden State ìwith regard to both the establishment of the facts and the determination of the content of th applicable lawî ( ibid. , p. 255, para. 36), but it has not been suggested that there is any such risk o prejudice in the present case. So far as inadmissibility might be based on an implied waiver o rights, the Court considers that only a much more prolonged and consistent inaction on the part o Mexico than any that the United States has alleged might be interpreted as implying such a waiver.
Furthermore, Mexico indicated a number of ways in which it brought to the attention of the Unite States the breaches which it perceived of the Vienna Convention. The fourth objection of th United States to admissibility cannot therefore be upheld.
45. The Court has now to examine the objection of the United States that the claim o Mexico is inadmissible in that Mexico should not be allowed to invoke against the United State standards that Mexico does not follow in its own practice. The United States contends that, i accordance with basic principles of administration of justice and the equality of States, bot litigants are to be held accountable to the same rules of international law. The objection in thi regard was presented in terms of the interpretation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, in th sense that, according to the United States, a treaty may not be interpreted so as to impose significantly greater burden on any one party than the other ( Diversion of Water from the Meuse, Judgment, 1937, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 70 , p. 20).
46. The Court would recall that the United States had already raised an objection of a simila nature before it in the LaGrand case; there, the Court held that it need not decide ìwhether thi argument of the United States, if true, would result in the inadmissibility of Germany’ submissionsî, since the United States had failed to prove that Germany’s own practice did no conform to the standards it was demanding from the United States ( I.C.J. Reports 2001 , p. 489 para. 63).
47. The Court would recall that it is in any event essential to have in mind the nature of th Vienna Convention. It lays down certain standards to be observed by all States parties, with a vie to the ìunimpeded conduct of consular relationsî, which, as the Court observed in 1979, i important in present-day international law ìin promoting the development of friendly relation among nations, and ensuring protection and assistance for aliens resident in the territories of othe Statesî ( United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), Order of 15 December 1979, I.C.J. Reports 1979 , pp. 19-20, para. 40). Even if it were shown,
therefore, that Mexico’s practice as regards the application of Article 36 was not beyond reproach this would not constitute a ground of objection to the admissibility of Mexico’s claim. The fift objection of the United States to admissibility cannot therefore be upheld.
* 48. Having established that it has jurisdiction to entertain Mexico’s claims and that they ar admissible, the Court will now turn to the merits of those claims.
* Article 36, paragraph 1 49. In its final submissions Mexico asks the Court to adjudge and declare that ìthe United States of America, in arresting, detaining, trying, convicting, an sentencing the 52 Mexican nationals on death row described in Mexico’s Memorial violated its international legal obligations to Mexico, in its own right and in th exercise of its right to diplomatic protection of its nationals, by failing to inform without delay, the 52 Mexican nationals after their arrest of their right to consula notification and access under Article 36 (1) (b) of the Vienna Convention on Consula Relations, and by depriving Mexico of its right to provide consular protection and th 52 nationals’ right to receive such protection as Mexico would provide unde Article 36 (1) (a) and (c) of the Conventionî.
50. The Court has already in its Judgment in the LaGrand case described Article 36 paragraph 1, as ìan interrelated rÈgime designed to facilitate the implementation of the system o consular protectionî ( I.C.J. Reports 2001 , p. 492, para. 74). It is thus convenient to set out th entirety of that paragraph.
ìWith a view toward facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating t nationals of the sending State:
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending Stat and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending State shall have the sam freedom with respect to communication with and access to consular officers of th sending State;
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, withou delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pendin trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication addressed to th consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall b forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall infor the person concerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph;
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who i in prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond with him and t arrange for his legal representation. They shall also have the right to visit an national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention in their distric in pursuance of a judgment. Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain fro taking action on behalf of a national who is in prison, custody or detention if h expressly opposes such action. 51. The United States as the receiving State does not deny its duty to perform thes obligations. However, it claims that the obligations apply only to individuals shown to be o Mexican nationality alone, and not to those of dual Mexican/United States nationality. The Unite States further contends inter alia that it has not committed any breach of Article 36 paragraph 1 (b) , upon the proper interpretation of ìwithout delayî as used in that subparagraph.
52. Thus two major issues under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , that are in dispute between th Parties are, first, the question of the nationality of the individuals concerned; and second, th question of the meaning to be given to the expression ìwithout delayî. The Court will examin each of these in turn.
53. The Parties have advanced their contentions as to nationality in three different lega contexts. The United States has begun by making an objection to admissibility, which the Cour has already dealt with (see paragraphs 41 and 42 above). The United States has further contende that a substantial number of the 52 persons listed in paragraph 16 above were United State nationals and that it thus had no obligation to these individuals under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) .
The Court will address this aspect of the matter in the following paragraphs. Finally, the Parties
disagree as to whether the requirement under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , for the information to b given ìwithout delayî becomes operative upon arrest or upon ascertainment of nationality. Th Court will address this issue later (see paragraph 63 below).
54. The Parties disagree as to what each of them must show as regards nationality i connection with the applicability of the terms of Article 36, paragraph 1, and as to how th principles of evidence have been met on the facts of the cases.
55. Both Parties recognize the well-settled principle in international law that a litigan seeking to establish the existence of a fact bears the burden of proving it (cf. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984 , p. 437, para. 101). Mexic acknowledges that it has the burden of proof to show that the 52 persons listed in paragraph 1 above were Mexican nationals to whom the provisions of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , in principl apply. It claims it has met this burden by providing to the Court the birth certificates of thes nationals, and declarations from 42 of them that they have not acquired U.S. nationality. Mexic further contends that the burden of proof lies on the United States should it wish to contend tha particular arrested persons of Mexican nationality were, at the relevant time, also United State nationals.
56. The United States accepts that in such cases it has the burden of proof to demonstrat United States nationality, but contends that nonetheless the ìburden of evidenceî as to this remain with Mexico. This distinction is explained by the United States as arising out of the fact tha persons of Mexican nationality may also have acquired United States citizenship by operation o law, depending on their parents’ dates and places of birth, places of residency, marital status at tim of their birth and so forth. In the view of the United States ìvirtually all such information is in th hands of Mexico through the now 52 individuals it representsî. The United States contends that i was the responsibility of Mexico to produce such information, which responsibility it has no discharged.
57. The Court finds that it is for Mexico to show that the 52 persons listed in paragraph 1 above held Mexican nationality at the time of their arrest. The Court notes that to this end Mexic has produced birth certificates and declarations of nationality, whose contents have not bee challenged by the United States.
The Court observes further that the United States has, however, questioned whether some o these individuals were not also United States nationals. Thus, the United States has informed th Court that, ìin the case of defendant Ayala (case No. 2) we are close to certain that Ayala is United States citizenî, and that this could be confirmed with absolute certainty if Mexico produce facts about this matter. Similarly Mr. Avena (case No. 1) was said to be ìlikelyî to be a Unite States citizen, and there was ìsome possibilityî that some 16 other defendants were United State citizens. As to six others, the United States said it ìcannot rule out the possibilityî of United State nationality. The Court takes the view that it was for the United States to demonstrate that this wa so and to furnish the Court with all information on the matter in its possession. In so far as relevant
data on that matter are said by the United States to lie within the knowledge of Mexico, it was fo the United States to have sought that information from the Mexican authorities. The Court canno accept that, because such information may have been in part in the hands of Mexico, it was fo Mexico to produce such information. It was for the United States to seek such information, wit sufficient specificity, and to demonstrate both that this was done and that the Mexican authoritie declined or failed to respond to such specific requests. At no stage, however, has the United State shown the Court that it made specific enquiries of those authorities about particular cases and tha responses were not forthcoming. The Court accordingly concludes that the United States has no met its burden of proof in its attempt to show that persons of Mexican nationality were also Unite States nationals.
The Court therefore finds that, as regards the 52 persons listed in paragraph 16 above, th United States had obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) .
58. Mexico asks the Court to find tha ìthe obligation in Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention require notification of consular rights and a reasonable opportunity for consular access befor the competent authorities of the receiving State take any action potentially detrimenta to the foreign national’s rightsî.
59. Mexico contends that, in each of the 52 cases before the Court, the United States failed t provide the arrested persons with information as to their rights under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) ìwithout delayî. It alleges that in one case, Mr. Esquivel (case No. 7), the arrested person wa informed, but only some 18 months after the arrest, while in another, that of Mr. Ju·rez (cas No. 10), information was given to the arrested person of his rights some 40 hours after arrest.
Mexico contends that this still constituted a violation, because ìwithout delayî is to be understoo as meaning ìimmediatelyî, and in any event before any interrogation occurs. Mexico further draw the Court’s attention to the fact that in this case a United States court found that there had been violation of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , and claims that the United States cannot disavow such determination by its own courts. In an Annex to its Memorial, Mexico mentions that, in a thir case (Mr. Ayala, case No. 2), the accused was informed of his rights upon his arrival on death row some four years after arrest. Mexico contends that in the remaining cases the Mexicans concerne were in fact never so informed by the United States authorities.
60. The United States disputes both the facts as presented by Mexico and the legal analysi of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , of the Vienna Convention offered by Mexico. The United State claims that Mr. Solache (case No. 47) was informed of his rights under the Vienna Conventio some seven months after his arrest. The United States further claims that many of the persons
concerned were of United States nationality and that at least seven of these individuals ìappear t have affirmatively claimed to be United States citizens at the time of their arrestî. These case were said to be those of Avena (case No. 1), Ayala (case No. 2), Benavides (case No. 3), Ocho (case No. 18), Salcido (case No. 22), Tafoya (case No. 24), and Alvarez (case No. 30). In the vie of the United States no duty of consular information arose in these cases. Further, in the contentio of the United States, in the cases of Mr. Ayala (case No. 2) and Mr. Salcido (case No. 22) there wa no reason to believe that the arrested persons were Mexican nationals at any stage; the informatio in the case of Mr. Ju·rez (case No. 10) was given ìwithout delayî.
61. The Court thus now turns to the interpretation of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , havin found in paragraph 57 above that it is applicable to the 52 persons listed in paragraph 16. It begin by noting that Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , contains three separate but interrelated elements: th right of the individual concerned to be informed without delay of his rights under Article 36 paragraph 1 (b) ; the right of the consular post to be notified without delay of the individual’ detention, if he so requests; and the obligation of the receiving State to forward without delay an communication addressed to the consular post by the detained person.
62. The third element of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , has not been raised on the facts befor the Court. The Court thus begins with the right of an arrested or detained individual t information.
63. The Court finds that the duty upon the detaining authorities to give the Article 36 paragraph 1 (b) , information to the individual arises once it is realized that the person is a foreig national, or once there are grounds to think that the person is probably a foreign national. Precisel when this may occur will vary with circumstances. The United States Department of State booklet Consular Notification and Access . Instructions for Federal, State and Local Law Enforcement and Other Officials Regarding Foreign Nationals in the United States and the Rights of Consular Officials to Assist Them , issued to federal, state and local authorities in order to promot compliance with Article 36 of the Vienna Convention points out in such cases that: ìmost, but no all, persons born outside the United States are not [citizens]. Unfamiliarity with English may als indicate foreign nationality.î The Court notes that when an arrested person himself claims to be o United States nationality, the realization by the authorities that he is not in fact a United State national, or grounds for that realization, is likely to come somewhat later in time.
64. The United States has told the Court that millions of aliens reside, either legally o illegally, on its territory, and moreover that its laws concerning citizenship are generous. Th United States has also pointed out that it is a multicultural society, with citizenship being held b persons of diverse appearance, speaking many languages. The Court appreciates that in the Unite States the language that a person speaks, or his appearance, does not necessarily indicate that he is
a foreign national. Nevertheless, and particularly in view of the large numbers of foreign national living in the United States, these very circumstances suggest that it would be desirable for enquir routinely to be made of the individual as to his nationality upon his detention, so that th obligations of the Vienna Convention may be complied with. The United States has informed th Court that some of its law enforcement authorities do routinely ask persons taken into detentio whether they are United States citizens. Indeed, were each individual to be told at that time that should he be a foreign national, he is entitled to ask for his consular post to be contacted compliance with this requirement under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , would be greatly enhanced.
The provision of such information could parallel the reading of those rights of which any perso taken into custody in connection with a criminal offence must be informed prior to interrogation b virtue of what in the United States is known as the ìMiranda ruleî; these rights include, inter alia the right to remain silent, the right to have an attorney present during questioning, and the right t have an attorney appointed at government expense if the person cannot afford one. The Cour notes that, according to the United States, such a practice in respect of the Vienna Conventio rights is already being followed in some local jurisdictions.
65. Bearing in mind the complexities explained by the United States, the Court now begin by examining the application of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , of the Vienna Convention to th 52 cases. In 45 of these cases, the Court has no evidence that the arrested persons claimed Unite States nationality, or were reasonably thought to be United States nationals, with specific enquirie being made in timely fashion to verify such dual nationality. The Court has explained i paragraph 57 above what inquiries it would have expected to have been made, within a short tim period, and what information should have been provided to the Court.
66. Seven persons, however, are asserted by the United States to have stated at the time o arrest that they were United States citizens. Only in the case of Mr. Salcido (case No. 22) has th Court been provided by the United States with evidence of such a statement. This has bee acknowledged by Mexico. Further, there has been no evidence before the Court to suggest tha there were in this case at the same time also indications of Mexican nationality, which should hav caused rapid enquiry by the arresting authorities and the providing of consular informatio ìwithout delayî. Mexico has accordingly not shown that in the case of Mr. Salcido the Unite States violated its obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) .
67. In the case of Mr. Ayala (case No. 2), while he was identified in a court record in 198 (three years after his arrest) as a United States citizen, there is no evidence to show this Court tha the accused did indeed claim upon his arrest to be a United States citizen. The Court has not bee informed of any enquiries made by the United States to confirm these assertions of United State nationality.
68. In the five other cases listed by the United States as cases where the individuals ìappea to have affirmatively claimed to be United States citizens at the time of their arrestî, no evidenc has been presented that such a statement was made at the time of arrest.
69. Mr. Avena (case No. 1) is listed in his arrest report as having been born in California.
His prison records describe him as of Mexican nationality. The United States has not shown th Court that it was engaged in enquiries to confirm United States nationality.
70. Mr. Benavides (case No. 3) was carrying an Immigration and Naturalization Servic immigration card at the time of arrest in 1991. The Court has not been made aware of any reaso why the arresting authorities should nonetheless have believed at the time of arrest that he was United States national. The evidence that his defence counsel in June 1993 informed the court tha Mr. Benavides had become a United States citizen is irrelevant to what was understood as to hi nationality at time of arrest.
71. So far as Mr. Ochoa is concerned (case No. 18), the Court observes that his arrest repor in 1990 refers to him as having been born in Mexico, an assertion that is repeated in a secon police report. Some two years later details in his court record refer to him as a United States citize born in Mexico. The Court is not provided with any further details. The United States has no shown this Court that it was aware of, or was engaged in active enquiry as to, alleged United State nationality at the time of his arrest.
72. Mr. Tafoya (case No. 24) was listed on the police booking sheet as having been born i Mexico. No further information is provided by the United States as to why this was done and what if any, further enquiries were being made concerning the defendant’s nationality.
73. Finally, the last of the seven persons referred to by the United States in this group Mr. Alvarez (case No. 30), was arrested in Texas on 20 June 1998. Texas records identified him a a United States citizen. Within three days of his arrest, however, the Texas authorities wer informed that the Immigration and Naturalization Service was holding investigations to determin whether, because of a previous conviction, Mr. Alvarez was subject to deportation as a foreig national. The Court has not been presented with evidence that rapid resolution was sought as to th question of Mr. Alvarez’s nationality.
74. The Court concludes that Mexico has failed to prove the violation by the United States o its obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , in the case of Mr. Salcido (case No. 22), and hi case will not be further commented upon. On the other hand, as regards the other individuals wh are alleged to have claimed United States nationality on arrest, whose cases have been considere in paragraphs 67 to 73 above, the argument of the United States cannot be upheld.
75. The question nonetheless remains as to whether, in each of the 45 cases referred to i paragraph 65 and of the six cases mentioned in paragraphs 67 to 73, the United States did provid the required information to the arrested persons ìwithout delayî. It is to that question that th Court now turns.
76. The Court has been provided with declarations from a number of the Mexican national concerned that attest to their never being informed of their rights under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) .
The Court at the outset notes that, in 47 such cases, the United States nowhere challenges this fac of information not being given. Nevertheless, in the case of Mr. Hern·ndez (case No. 34), th United States observes tha ìAlthough the [arresting] officer did not ask Hern·ndez Llanas whether h wanted them to inform the Mexican Consulate of his arrest, it was certainly no unreasonable for him to assume that an escaped convict would not want the Consulat of the country from which he escaped notified of his arrest. The Court notes that the clear duty to provide consular information under Article 36 paragraph 1 (b) , does not invite assumptions as to what the arrested person might prefer, as ground for not informing him. It rather gives the arrested person, once informed, the right to say h nonetheless does not wish his consular post to be notified. It necessarily follows that in each o these 47 cases, the duty to inform ìwithout delayî has been violated.
77. In four cases, namely Ayala (case No. 2), Esquivel (case No. 7), Ju·rez (case No. 10) an Solache (case No. 47), some doubts remain as to whether the information that was given wa provided without delay. For these, some examination of the term is thus necessary.
78. This is a matter on which the Parties have very different views. According to Mexico the timing of the notice to the detained person ìis critical to the exercise of the rights provided b Article 36î and the phrase ìwithout delayî in paragraph 1 (b) requires ìunqualified immediacyî.
Mexico further contends that, in view of the object and purpose of Article 36, which is to enabl ìmeaningful consular assistanceî and the safeguarding of the vulnerability of foreign nationals i custody ìconsular notification . . . must occur immediately upon detention and prior to an interrogation of the foreign detainee, so that the consul may offer useful advice abou the foreign legal system and provide assistance in obtaining counsel before the foreig national makes any ill-informed decisions or the State takes any action potentiall prejudicial to his rightsî.
79. Thus, in Mexico’s view, it would follow that in any case in which a foreign national wa interrogated before being informed of his rights under Article 36, there would ipso facto be breach of that Article, however rapidly after the interrogation the information was given to th foreign national. Mexico accordingly includes the case of Mr. Ju·rez among those where it claim violation of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , as he was interrogated before being informed of hi consular rights, some 40 hours after arrest.
80. Mexico has also invoked the travaux prÈparatoires of the Vienna Convention in suppor of its interpretation of the requirement that the arrested person be informed ìwithout delayî of th right to ask that the consular post be notified. In particular, Mexico recalled that the phras proposed to the Conference by the International Law Commission, ìwithout undue delayî, wa replaced by the United Kingdom proposal to delete the word ìundueî. The United Kingdo representative had explained that this would avoid the implication that ìsome delay wa permissibleî and no delegate had expressed dissent with the USSR and Japanese statements that th result of the amendment would be to require information ìimmediatelyî.
81. The United States disputed this interpretation of the phrase ìwithout delayî. In its vie it did not mean ìimmediately, and before interrogationî and such an understanding was supporte neither by the terminology, nor by the object and purpose of the Vienna Convention, nor by it travaux prÈparatoires . In the booklet referred to in paragraph 63 above, the State Departmen explains that ìwithout delayî means ìthere should be no deliberate delayî and that the require action should be taken ìas soon as reasonably possible under the circumstancesî. It was normall to be expected that ìnotification to consular officersî would have been made ìwithin 24 to 72 hour of the arrest or detentionî. The United States further contended that such an interpretation of th words ìwithout delayî would be reasonable in itself and also allow a consistent interpretation o the phrase as it occurs in each of three different occasions in Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) . As for th travaux prÈparatoires , they showed only that undue or deliberate delay had been rejected a unacceptable.
82. According to the United States, the purpose of Article 36 was to facilitate the exercise o consular functions by a consular officer:
ìThe significance of giving consular information to a national is thus limited . . .
It is a procedural device that allows the foreign national to trigger the related proces of notification . . . [It] cannot possibly be fundamental to the criminal justic process. 83. The Court now addresses the question of the proper interpretation of the expressio ìwithout delayî in the light of arguments put to it by the Parties. The Court begins by noting tha the precise meaning of ìwithout delayî, as it is to be understood in Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , is
not defined in the Convention. This phrase therefore requires interpretation according to th customary rules of treaty interpretation reflected in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention o the Law of Treaties.
84. Article 1 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which defines certain of th terms used in the Convention, offers no definition of the phrase ìwithout delayî. Moreover, in th different language versions of the Convention various terms are employed to render the phrase ìwithout delayî in Article 36 and ìimmediatelyî in Article 14. The Court observes that dictionar definitions, in the various languages of the Vienna Convention, offer diverse meanings of the ter ìwithout delayî (and also of ìimmediatelyî). It is therefore necessary to look elsewhere for a understanding of this term.
85. As for the object and purpose of the Convention, the Court observes that Article 3 provides for consular officers to be free to communicate with nationals of the sending State, t have access to them, to visit and speak with them and to arrange for their legal representation. It i not envisaged, either in Article 36, paragraph 1, or elsewhere in the Convention, that consula functions entail a consular officer himself or herself acting as the legal representative or mor directly engaging in the criminal justice process. Indeed, this is confirmed by the wording o Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Convention. Thus, neither the terms of the Convention as normall understood, nor its object and purpose, suggest that ìwithout delayî is to be understood a ìimmediately upon arrest and before interrogationî.
86. The Court further notes that, notwithstanding the uncertainties in the travaux prÈparatoires , they too do not support such an interpretation. During the diplomatic conference the conference’s expert, former Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission explained to the delegates that the words ìwithout undue delayî had been introduced by th Commission, after long discussion in both the plenary and drafting committee, to allow for specia circumstances which might permit information as to consular notification not to be given at once.
Germany, the only one of two States to present an amendment, proposed adding ìbut at lates within one monthî. There was an extended discussion by many different delegates as to what suc outer time-limit would be acceptable. During that debate no delegate proposed ìimmediatelyî.
The shortest specific period suggested was by the United Kingdom, namely ìpromptlyî and n later than ì48 hoursî afterwards. Eventually, in the absence of agreement on a precise time period the United Kingdom’s other proposal to delete the word ìundueî was accepted as the positio around which delegates could converge. It is also of interest that there is no suggestion in th travaux that the phrase ìwithout delayî might have different meanings in each of the three sets o circumstances in which it is used in Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) .
87. The Court thus finds that ìwithout delayî is not necessarily to be interpreted a ìimmediatelyî upon arrest. It further observes that during the Conference debates on this term, n delegate made any connection with the issue of interrogation. The Court considers that the
provision in Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , that the receiving State authorities ìshall inform the perso concerned without delay of his rightsî cannot be interpreted to signify that the provision of suc information must necessarily precede any interrogation, so that the commencement of interrogatio before the information is given would be a breach of Article 36.
88. Although, by application of the usual rules of interpretation, ìwithout delayî as regard the duty to inform an individual under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , is not to be understood a necessarily meaning ìimmediately upon arrestî, there is nonetheless a duty upon the arrestin authorities to give that information to an arrested person as soon as it is realized that the person is foreign national, or once there are grounds to think that the person is probably a foreign national.
89. With one exception, no information as to entitlement to consular notification was give in any of the cases cited in paragraph 77 within any of the various time periods suggested by th delegates to the Conference on the Vienna Convention, or by the United States itself (se paragraphs 81 and 86 above). Indeed, the information was given either not at all or at periods ver significantly removed from the time of arrest. In the case of Mr. Ju·rez (case No. 10), th defendant was informed of his consular rights 40 hours after his arrest. The Court notes, however that Mr. Ju·rez’s arrest report stated that he had been born in Mexico; moreover, there had bee indications of his Mexican nationality from the time of his initial interrogation by agents of th Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) following his arrest. It follows that Mr. Ju·rez’s Mexica nationality was apparent from the outset of his detention by the United States authorities. In thes circumstances, in accordance with its interpretation of the expression ìwithout delayî (se paragraph 88 above), the Court concludes that the United States violated the obligation incumben upon it under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , to inform Mr. Ju·rez without delay of his consular rights.
The Court notes that the same finding was reached by a California Superior Court, albeit o different grounds.
90. The Court accordingly concludes that, with respect to each of the individuals listed i paragraph 16, with the exception of Mr. Salcido (case No. 22; see paragraph 74 above), the Unite States has violated its obligation under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , of the Vienna Convention t provide information to the arrested person.
91. As noted above, Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , contains three elements. Thus far, the Cour has been dealing with the right of an arrested person to be informed that he may ask for hi consular post to be notified. The Court now turns to another aspect of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) .
The Court finds the United States is correct in observing that the fact that a Mexican consular pos was not notified under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , does not of necessity show that the arreste person was not informed of his rights under that provision. He may have been informed an declined to have his consular post notified. The giving of the information is relevant, however, fo satisfying the element in Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , on which the other two elements therei depend.
92. In only two cases has the United States claimed that the arrested person was informed o his consular rights but asked for the consular post not to be notified. These are Mr. Ju·re (case No. 10) and Mr. Solache (case No. 47).
93. The Court is satisfied that when Mr. Ju·rez (case No. 10) was informed of his consula rights 40 hours after his arrest (see paragraph 89) he chose not to have his consular post notified.
As regards Mr. Solache (case No. 47), however, it is not sufficiently clear to the Court, on th evidence before it, that he requested that his consular post should not be notified. Indeed, the Cour has not been provided with any reasons as to why, if a request of non-notification was made, th consular post was then notified some three months later.
94. In a further three cases, the United States alleges that the consular post was formall notified of the detention of one of its Mexican nationals without prior information to the individua as to his consular rights. These are Mr. Covarrubias (case No. 6), Mr. Hern·ndez (case No. 34) an Mr. Reyes (case No. 54). The United States further contends that the Mexican authorities wer contacted regarding the case of Mr. Loza (case No. 52).
95. The Court notes that, in the case of Mr. Covarrubias (case No. 6), the consular authoritie learned from third parties of his arrest shortly after it occurred. Some 16 months later, court-appointed interpreter requested that the consulate intervene in the case prior to trial. It woul appear doubtful whether an interpreter can be considered a competent authority for triggering th interrelated provisions of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , of the Vienna Convention. In the case o Mr. Reyes (case No. 34), the United States has simply told the Court that an Oregon Department o Justice attorney had advised United States authorities that both the District Attorney and th arresting detective advised the Mexican consular authorities of his arrest. No information is give as to when this occurred, in relation to the date of his arrest. Mr. Reyes did receive assistanc before his trial. In these two cases, the Court considers that, even on the hypothesis that th conduct of the United States had no serious consequences for the individuals concerned, it di nonetheless constitute a violation of the obligations incumbent upon the United States unde Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) .
96. In the case of Mr. Loza (case No. 52), a United States Congressman from Ohio contacte the Mexican Embassy on behalf of Ohio prosecutors, some four months after the accused’s arrest ìto enquire about the procedures for obtaining a certified copy of Loza’s birth certificateî. Th Court has not been provided with a copy of the Congressman’s letter and is therefore unable t ascertain whether it explained that Mr. Loza had been arrested. The response from the Embass (which is also not included in the documentation provided to the Court) was passed by th Congressman to the prosecuting attorney, who then asked the Civil Registry of Guadalajara for copy of the birth certificate. This request made no specific mention of Mr. Loza’s arrest. Mexic contends that its consulate was never formally notified of Mr. Loza’s arrest, of which it only
became aware after he had been convicted and sentenced to death. Mexico includes the case o Mr. Loza among those in which the United States was in breach of its obligation of consula notification. Taking account of all these elements, and in particular of the fact that the Embass was contacted four months after the arrest, and that the consular post became aware of th defendant’s detention only after he had been convicted and sentenced, the Court concludes that i the case of Mr. Loza the United States violated the obligation of consular notification without dela incumbent upon it under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) .
97. Mr. Hern·ndez (case No. 34) was arrested in Texas on Wednesday 15 October 1997.
The United States authorities had no reason to believe he might have American citizenship. Th consular post was notified the following Monday, that is five days (corresponding to only thre working days) thereafter. The Court finds that, in the circumstances, the United States did notif the consular post without delay, in accordance with its obligation under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) .
98. In the first of its final submissions, Mexico also asks the Court to find that the violation it ascribes to the United States in respect of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , have also deprive ìMexico of its right to provide consular protection and the 52 nationals’ right to receive suc protection as Mexico would provide under Article 36 (1) (a) and (c) of the Conventionî.
99. The relationship between the three subparagraphs of Article 36, paragraph 1, has bee described by the Court in its Judgment in the LaGrand case ( I.C.J. Judgments 2001 , p. 492 para. 74) as ìan interrelated rÈgimeî. The legal conclusions to be drawn from that interrelationshi necessarily depend upon the facts of each case. In the LaGrand case, the Court found that th failure for 16 years to inform the brothers of their right to have their consul notified effectivel prevented the exercise of other rights that Germany might have chosen to exercise unde subparagraphs (a) and (c) .
100. It is necessary to revisit the interrelationship of the three subparagraphs of Article 36 paragraph 1, in the light of the particular facts and circumstances of the present case.
101. The Court would first recall that, in the case of Mr. Ju·rez (case No. 10) (se paragraph 93 above), when the defendant was informed of his rights, he declined to have hi consular post notified. Thus in this case there was no violation of either subparagraph (a) o subparagraph (c) of Article 36, paragraph 1.
102. In the remaining cases, because of the failure of the United States to act in conformit with Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , Mexico was in effect precluded (in some cases totally, and i some cases for prolonged periods of time) from exercising its right under paragraph 1 (a) t communicate with its nationals and have access to them. As the Court has already had occasion to
explain, it is immaterial whether Mexico would have offered consular assistance, ìor whether different verdict would have been rendered. It is sufficient that the Convention conferred thes rightsî ( I.C.J. Reports 2001 , p. 492, para. 74), which might have been acted upon.
103. The same is true, pari passu , of certain rights identified in subparagraph (c) : ìconsula officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who is in prison, custody o detention, and to converse and correspond with him . . . 104. On the other hand, and on the particular facts of this case, no such generalized answe can be given as regards a further entitlement mentioned in subparagraph (c) , namely, the right o consular officers ìto arrange for [the] legal representationî of the foreign national. Mexico has lai much emphasis in this litigation upon the importance of consular officers being able to arrange fo such representation before and during trial, and especially at sentencing, in cases in which a sever penalty may be imposed. Mexico has further indicated the importance of any financial or othe assistance that consular officers may provide to defence counsel, inter alia for investigation of th defendant’s family background and mental condition, when such information is relevant to th case. The Court observes that the exercise of the rights of the sending State under Article 36 paragraph 1 (c) , depends upon notification by the authorities of the receiving State. It may be however, that information drawn to the attention of the sending State by other means may stil enable its consular officers to assist in arranging legal representation for its national. In th following cases, the Mexican consular authorities learned of their national’s detention in time t provide such assistance, either through notification by United States authorities (albeit belatedly i terms of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) ) or through other channels: Benavides (case No. 3);
Covarrubias (case No. 6); Esquivel (case No. 7); Hoyos (case No. 9); Mendoza (case No. 17);
RamÌrez (case No. 20); S·nchez (case No. 23); Verano (case No. 27); Zamudio (case No. 29);
GÛmez (case No. 33); Hern·ndez (case No. 34); RamÌrez (case No. 41); Rocha (case No. 42);
Solache (case No. 47); Camargo (case No. 49) and Reyes (case No. 54).
105. In relation to Mr. ManrÌquez (case No. 14), the Court lacks precise information as t when his consular post was notified. It is merely given to understand that it was two years prior t conviction, and that Mr. ManrÌquez himself had never been informed of his consular rights. Ther is also divergence between the Parties in regard to the case of Mr. Fuentes (case No. 15), wher Mexico claims it became aware of his detention during trial and the United States says thi occurred during jury selection, prior to the actual commencement of the trial. In the case o Mr. Arias (case No. 44), the Mexican authorities became aware of his detention less than one wee before the commencement of the trial. In those three cases, the Court concludes that the Unite States violated its obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1 (c) .
106. On this aspect of the case, the Court thus concludes:
(1) that the United States committed breaches of the obligation incumbent upon it under Article 36 paragraph 1 (b) , of the Vienna Convention to inform detained Mexican nationals of their right under that paragraph, in the case of the following 51 individuals: Avena (case No. 1), Ayal (case No. 2), Benavides (case No. 3), Carrera (case No. 4), Contreras (case No. 5), Covarrubia (case No. 6), Esquivel (case No. 7), GÛmez (case No. 8), Hoyos (case No. 9), Ju·rez (cas No. 10), LÛpez (case No. 11), Lupercio (case No. 12), Maciel (case No. 13), ManrÌquez (cas No. 14), Fuentes (case No. 15), MartÌnez (case No. 16), Mendoza (case No. 17), Ochoa (cas No. 18), Parra (case No. 19), RamÌrez (case No. 20), Salazar (case No. 21), S·nchez (cas No. 23), Tafoya (case No. 24), Valdez (case No. 25), Vargas (case No. 26), Verano (cas No. 27), Zamudio (case No. 29), Alvarez (case No. 30), Fierro (case No. 31), GarcÌa (cas No. 32), GÛmez (case No. 33), Hern·ndez (case No. 34), Ibarra (case No. 35), Leal (cas No. 36), Maldonado (case No. 37), MedellÌn (case No. 38), Moreno (case No. 39), Plata (cas No. 40), RamÌrez (case No. 41), Rocha (case No. 42), Regalado (case No. 43), Arias (cas No. 44), Caballero (case No. 45), Flores (case No. 46), Solache (case No. 47), Fong (cas No. 48), Camargo (case No. 49), PÈrez (case No. 51), Loza (case No. 52), Torres (case No. 53 and Reyes (case No. 54);
(2) that the United States committed breaches of the obligation incumbent upon it under Article 36 paragraph 1 (b) to notify the Mexican consular post of the detention of the Mexican national listed in subparagraph (1) above, except in the cases of Mr. Ju·rez (No. 10) and Mr. Hern·nde (No. 34);
(3) that by virtue of its breaches of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , as described in subparagraph (2 above, the United States also violated the obligation incumbent upon it under Article 36 paragraph 1 (a) , of the Vienna Convention to enable Mexican consular officers to communicat with and have access to their nationals, as well as its obligation under paragraph 1 (c) of tha Article regarding the right of consular officers to visit their detained nationals;
(4) that the United States, by virtue of these breaches of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , also violate the obligation incumbent upon it under paragraph 1 (c) of that Article to enable Mexica consular officers to arrange for legal representation of their nationals in the case of th following individuals: Avena (case No. 1), Ayala (case No. 2), Carrera (case No. 4), Contrera (case No. 5), GÛmez (case No. 8), LÛpez (case No. 11), Lupercio (case No. 12), Maciel (cas No. 13), ManrÌquez (case No. 14), Fuentes (case No. 15), MartÌnez (case No. 16), Ochoa (cas No. 18), Parra (case No. 19), Salazar (case No. 21), Tafoya (case No. 24), Valdez (cas No. 25), Vargas (case No. 26), Alvarez (case No. 30), Fierro (case No. 31), GarcÌa (cas No. 32), Ibarra (case No. 35), Leal (case No. 36), Maldonado (case No. 37), MedellÌn (cas No. 38), Moreno (case No. 39), Plata (case No. 40), Regalado (case No. 43), Arias (cas No. 44), Caballero (case No. 45), Flores (case No. 46), Fong (case No. 48), PÈrez (cas No. 51), Loza (case No. 52) and Torres (case No. 53).
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Article 36, paragraph 2 107. In its third final submission Mexico asks the Court to adjudge and declare that ìth United States violated its obligations under Article 36 (2) of the Vienna Convention by failing t provide meaningful and effective review and reconsideration of convictions and sentences impaire by a violation of Article 36 (1)î.
108. Article 36, paragraph 2, provides:
ìThe rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be exercised i conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to th purposes for which the rights accorded under this article are intended. 109. In this connection, Mexico has argued that the United State ìBy applying provisions of its municipal law to defeat or foreclose remedies fo the violation of rights conferred by Article 36 . thus failing to provide meaningfu review and reconsideration of severe sentences imposed in proceedings that violate Article 36 . . . . has violated, and continues to violate, the Vienna Convention. More specifically, Mexico contends that:
ìThe United States uses several municipal legal doctrines to prevent finding an legal effect from the violations of Article 36. First , despite this Court’s clear analysi in LaGrand , U.S. courts, at both the state and federal level, continue to invoke defaul doctrines to bar any review of Article 36 violations . even when the national ha been unaware of his rights to consular notification and communication and thus hi ability to raise their violation as an issue at trial, due to the competent authorities failure to comply with Article 36. 110. Against this contention by Mexico, the United States argues that:
ìthe criminal justice systems of the United States address all errors in process throug both judicial and executive clemency proceedings, relying upon the latter when rule of default have closed out the possibility of the former. That is, the ëlaws an regulations’ of the United States provide for the correction of mistakes that may b relevant to a criminal defendant to occur through a combination of judicial review an clemency. These processes together, working with other competent authorities, giv full effect to the purposes for which Article 36 (1) is intended, in conformity with
Article 36 (2). And, insofar as a breach of Article 36 (1) has occurred, thes procedures satisfy the remedial function of Article 36 (2) by allowing the Unite States to provide review and reconsideration of convictions and sentences consisten with LaGrand . 111. The ìprocedural defaultî rule in United States law has already been brought to th attention of the Court in the LaGrand case. The following brief definition of the rule was provide by Mexico in its Memorial in this case and has not been challenged by the United States: ì defendant who could have raised, but fails to raise, a legal issue at trial will generally not b permitted to raise it in future proceedings, on appeal or in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus î.
The rule requires exhaustion of remedies, inter alia , at the state level and before a habeas corpus motion can be filed with federal courts. In the LaGrand case, the rule in question was applied b United States federal courts; in the present case, Mexico also complains of the application of th rule in certain state courts of criminal appeal.
112. The Court has already considered the application of the ìprocedural defaultî rule alleged by Mexico to be a hindrance to the full implementation of the international obligations o the United States under Article 36, in the LaGrand case, when the Court addressed the issue of it implications for the application of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention. The Cour emphasized that ìa distinction must be drawn between that rule as such and its specific applicatio in the present caseî. The Court stated:
ìIn itself, the rule does not violate Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. Th problem arises when the procedural default rule does not allow the detained individua to challenge a conviction and sentence by claiming, in reliance on Article 36 paragraph 1, of the Convention, that the competent national authorities failed t comply with their obligation to provide the requisite consular information ëwithou delay’, thus preventing the person from seeking and obtaining consular assistanc from the sending State.î ( I.C.J. Reports 2001 , p. 497, para. 90. On this basis, the Court concluded that ìthe procedural default rule prevented counsel for th LaGrands to effectively challenge their convictions and sentences other than on United State constitutional groundsî ( ibid. , para. 91). This statement of the Court seems equally valid i relation to the present case, where a number of Mexican nationals have been placed exactly in suc a situation.
113. The Court will return to this aspect below, in the context of Mexico’s claims as t remedies. For the moment, the Court simply notes that the procedural default rule has not bee revised, nor has any provision been made to prevent its application in cases where it has been th failure of the United States itself to inform that may have precluded counsel from being in position to have raised the question of a violation of the Vienna Convention in the initial trial. It
thus remains the case that the procedural default rule may continue to prevent courts from attachin legal significance to the fact, inter alia , that the violation of the rights set forth in Article 36 paragraph 1, prevented Mexico, in a timely fashion, from retaining private counsel for certai nationals and otherwise assisting in their defence. In such cases, application of the procedura default rule would have the effect of preventing ìfull effect [from being] given to the purposes fo which the rights accorded under this article are intendedî, and thus violate paragraph 2 o Article 36. The Court notes moreover that in several of the cases cited in Mexico’s fina submissions the procedural default rule has already been applied, and that in others it could b applied at subsequent stages in the proceedings. However, in none of the cases, save for the thre mentioned in paragraph 114 below, have the criminal proceedings against the Mexican national concerned already reached a stage at which there is no further possibility of judicial re-examinatio of those cases; that is to say, all possibility is not yet excluded of ìreview and reconsiderationî o conviction and sentence, as called for in the LaGrand case, and as explained further i paragraphs 128 and following below. It would therefore be premature for the Court to conclude a this stage that, in those cases, there is already a violation of the obligations under Article 36 paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention.
114. By contrast, the Court notes that in the case of three Mexican nationals, Mr. Fierro (cas No. 31), Mr. Moreno (case No. 39), and Mr. Torres (case No. 53), conviction and sentence hav become final. Moreover, in the case of Mr. Torres the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ha set an execution date (see paragraph 21 above, in fine ). The Court must therefore conclude that, i relation to these three individuals, the United States is in breach of the obligations incumbent upo it under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention.
* Legal consequences of the breach 115. Having concluded that in most of the cases brought before the Court by Mexico in th 52 instances, there has been a failure to observe the obligations prescribed by Article 36 paragraph 1 (b) , of the Vienna Convention, the Court now proceeds to the examination of the lega consequences of such a breach and of what legal remedies should be considered for the breach.
116. Mexico in its fourth, fifth and sixth submissions asks the Court to adjudge and declare:
ì(4) that pursuant to the injuries suffered by Mexico in its own right and in the exercis of diplomatic protection of its nationals, Mexico is entitled to full reparation fo these injuries in the form of restitutio in integrum ;
(5) that this restitution consists of the obligation to restore the status quo ante b annulling or otherwise depriving of full force or effect the conviction an sentences of all 52 Mexican nationals; [and (6) that this restitution also includes the obligation to take all measures necessary t ensure that a prior violation of Article 36 shall not affect the subsequen proceedings. 117. In support of its fourth and fifth submissions, Mexico argues that ìIt is well-establishe that the primary form of reparation available to a State injured by an internationally wrongful act i restitutio in integrum î, and that ìThe United States is therefore obliged to take the necessary actio to restore the status quo ante in respect of Mexico’s nationals detained, tried, convicted an sentenced in violation of their internationally recognized rightsî. To restore the status quo ante Mexico contends that ìrestitution here must take the form of annulment of the convictions an sentences that resulted from the proceedings tainted by the Article 36 violationsî, and that ìI follows from the very nature of restitutio that, when a violation of an international obligation i manifested in a judicial act, that act must be annulled and thereby deprived of any force or effect i the national legal systemî. Mexico therefore asks in its submissions that the convictions an sentences of the 52 Mexican nationals be annulled, and that, in any future criminal proceeding against these 52 Mexican nationals, evidence obtained in breach of Article 36 of the Vienn Convention be excluded.
118. The United States on the other hand argues:
ì LaGrand ’s holding calls for the United States to provide, in each case, ëreview an reconsideration’ that ëtakes account of’ the violation, not ëreview and reversal’, no across-the-board exclusions of evidence or nullification of convictions simply becaus a breach of Article 36 (1) occurred and without regard to its effect upon the convictio and sentence and, not . . . ëa precise, concrete, stated result: to re-establish the status quo ante ’î.
119. The general principle on the legal consequences of the commission of an internationall wrongful act was stated by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Factory at ChorzÛw case as follows: ìIt is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement involves a obligation to make reparation in an adequate form.î ( Factory at ChorzÛw, Jurisdiction, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9 , p. 21.) What constitutes ìreparation in an adequate formî clearly varie depending upon the concrete circumstances surrounding each case and the precise nature and scop of the injury, since the question has to be examined from the viewpoint of what is the ìreparation i an adequate formî that corresponds to the injury. In a subsequent phase of the same case, th Permanent Court went on to elaborate on this point as follows:
ìThe essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act . principle which seems to be established by international practice and in particular b the decisions of arbitral tribunals . is that reparation must, as far as possible, wip out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, i all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.î ( Factory at ChorzÛw, Merits, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17 , p. 47. 120. In the LaGrand case the Court made a general statement on the principle involved a follows:
ìThe Court considers in this respect that if the United States, notwithstanding it commitment [to ensure implementation of the specific measures adopted i performance of its obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) ], should fail in it obligation of consular notification to the detriment of German nationals, an apolog would not suffice in cases where the individuals concerned have been subjected t prolonged detention or convicted and sentenced to severe penalties. In the case o such a conviction and sentence, it would be incumbent upon the United States to allo the review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking account of th violation of the rights set forth in the Convention. This obligation can be carried ou in various ways. The choice of means must be left to the United States.î ( I.C.J. Reports 2001 , pp. 513-514, para. 125. 121. Similarly, in the present case the Court’s task is to determine what would be adequat reparation for the violations of Article 36. It should be clear from what has been observed abov that the internationally wrongful acts committed by the United States were the failure of it competent authorities to inform the Mexican nationals concerned, to notify Mexican consular post and to enable Mexico to provide consular assistance. It follows that the remedy to make good thes violations should consist in an obligation on the United States to permit review and reconsideratio of these nationals’ cases by the United States courts, as the Court will explain further i paragraphs 128 to 134 below, with a view to ascertaining whether in each case the violation o Article 36 committed by the competent authorities caused actual prejudice to the defendant in th process of administration of criminal justice.
122. The Court reaffirms that the case before it concerns Article 36 of the Vienn Convention and not the correctness as such of any conviction or sentencing. The question o whether the violations of Article 36, paragraph 1, are to be regarded as having, in the causa sequence of events, ultimately led to convictions and severe penalties is an integral part of crimina proceedings before the courts of the United States and is for them to determine in the process o review and reconsideration. In so doing, it is for the courts of the United States to examine th facts, and in particular the prejudice and its causes, taking account of the violation of the rights se forth in the Convention.
123. It is not to be presumed, as Mexico asserts, that partial or total annulment of convictio or sentence provides the necessary and sole remedy. In this regard, Mexico cites the recen Judgment of this Court in the case concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) , in which the ìCourt ordered the cancellation of an arres warrant issued by a Belgian judicial official in violation of the international immunity of the Cong Minister for Foreign Affairsî. However, the present case has clearly to be distinguished from th Arrest Warrant case. In that case, the question of the legality under international law of the act o issuing the arrest warrant against the Congolese Minister for Foreign Affairs by the Belgian judicia authorities was itself the subject-matter of the dispute. Since the Court found that act to be i violation of international law relating to immunity, the proper legal consequence was for the Cour to order the cancellation of the arrest warrant in question ( I.C.J. Reports 2002 , p. 33). By contrast in the present case it is not the convictions and sentences of the Mexican nationals which are to b regarded as a violation of international law, but solely certain breaches of treaty obligations whic preceded them.
124. Mexico has further contended that the right to consular notification and consula communication under the Vienna Convention is a fundamental human right that constitutes part o due process in criminal proceedings and should be guaranteed in the territory of each of th Contracting Parties to the Vienna Convention; according to Mexico, this right, as such, is s fundamental that its infringement will ipso facto produce the effect of vitiating the entire process o the criminal proceedings conducted in violation of this fundamental right. Whether or not th Vienna Convention rights are human rights is not a matter that this Court need decide. The Cour would, however, observe that neither the text nor the object and purpose of the Convention, nor an indication in the travaux prÈparatoires , support the conclusion that Mexico draws from it contention in that regard.
125. For these reasons, Mexico’s fourth and fifth submissions cannot be upheld.
126. The reasoning of the Court on the fifth submission of Mexico is equally valid in relatio to the sixth submission of Mexico. In elaboration of its sixth submission, Mexico contends tha ìAs an aspect of restitutio in integrum , Mexico is also entitled to an order that in any subsequen criminal proceedings against the nationals, statements and confessions obtained prior to notificatio to the national of his right to consular assistance be excludedî. Mexico argues that ìTh exclusionary rule applies in both common law and civil law jurisdictions and requires the exclusio of evidence that is obtained in a manner that violates due process obligationsî, and on this basi concludes tha ìThe status of the exclusionary rule as a general principle of law permits th Court to order that the United States is obligated to apply this principle in respect o statements and confessions given to United States law enforcement officials prior to
the accused Mexican nationals being advised of their consular rights in any subsequen criminal proceedings against them. 127. The Court does not consider that it is necessary to enter into an examination of th merits of the contention advanced by Mexico that the ìexclusionary ruleî is ìa general principle o law under Article 38(1) (c) of the . . . Statuteî of the Court. The issue raised by Mexico in its sixt submission relates to the question of what legal consequences flow from the breach of th obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1 . a question which the Court has already sufficientl discussed above in relation to the fourth and the fifth submissons of Mexico. The Court is of th view that this question is one which has to be examined under the concrete circumstances of eac case by the United States courts concerned in the process of their review and reconsideration. Fo this reason, the sixth submission of Mexico cannot be upheld.
128. While the Court has rejected the fourth, fifth and sixth submissions of Mexico relatin to the remedies for the breaches by the United States of its international obligations unde Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, the fact remains that such breaches have been committed, a the Court has found, and it is thus incumbent upon the Court to specify what remedies are require in order to redress the injury done to Mexico and to its nationals by the United States throug non-compliance with those international obligations. As has already been observed i paragraph 120, the Court in the LaGrand Judgment stated the general principle to be applied i such cases by way of a remedy to redress an injury of this kind ( I.C.J. Reports 2001 , pp. 513-514 para. 125).
129. In this regard, Mexico’s seventh submission also asks the Court to adjudge and declare:
ìThat to the extent that any of the 52 convictions or sentences are not annulled the United States shall provide, by means of its own choosing, meaningful an effective review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of th 52 nationals, and that this obligation cannot be satisfied by means of clemenc proceedings or if any municipal law rule or doctrine [that fails to attach lega significance to an Article 36 (1) violation] is applied. 130. On this question of ìreview and reconsiderationî, the United States takes the positio that it has indeed conformed its conduct to the LaGrand Judgment. In a further elaboration of thi point, the United States argues that ì[t]he Court said in LaGrand that the choice of means fo allowing the review and reconsideration it called for ëmust be left’ to the United Statesî, but tha ìMexico would not leave this choice to the United States but have the Court undertake the revie instead and decide at once that the breach requires the conviction and sentence to be set aside i each caseî.
131. In stating in its Judgment in the LaGrand case that ìthe United States of America, by means of its own choosing , shall allow the review and reconsideration of the conviction an sentenceî ( I.C.J. Reports 2001 , p. 516, para. 128; emphasis added), the Court acknowledged tha the concrete modalities for such review and reconsideration should be left primarily to the Unite States. It should be underlined, however, that this freedom in the choice of means for such revie and reconsideration is not without qualification: as the passage of the Judgment quoted abov makes abundantly clear, such review and reconsideration has to be carried out ìby taking accoun of the violation of the rights set forth in the Conventionî ( I.C.J. Reports 2001 , p. 514, para. 125) including, in particular, the question of the legal consequences of the violation upon the crimina proceedings that have followed the violation.
132. The United States argues (1) ìthat the Court’s decision in LaGrand in calling for revie and reconsideration called for a process to re-examine a conviction and sentence in light of breach of Article 36î; (2) that ìin calling for a process of review, the Court necessarily implie that one legitimate result of that process might be a conclusion that the conviction and sentenc should standî; and (3) ìthat the relief Mexico seeks in this case is flatly inconsistent with th Judgment in LaGrand : it seeks precisely the award of a substantive outcome that the LaGrand Court declined to provideî.
133. However, the Court wishes to point out that the current situation in the United State criminal procedure, as explained by the Agent at the hearings, is that ìIf the defendant alleged a trial that a failure of consular information resulted in harm to a particular right essential to a fair trial , an appeals court can review how the lower court handled that claim of prejudice î, but that ì If the foreign national did not raise his Article 36 claim at trial, he may face procedural constraints [i.e., the application of the procedural default rule] on raising that particular claim in direct o collateral judicial appealsî (emphasis added). As a result, a claim based on the violation o Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention, however meritorious in itself, could be barre in the courts of the United States by the operation of the procedural default rule (see paragraph 11 above).
134. It is not sufficient for the United States to argue that ì[w]hatever label [the Mexica defendant] places on his claim, his right . . . must and will be vindicated if it is raised in some form at trialî (emphasis added), and tha ìIn that way, even though a failure to label the complaint as a breach of th Vienna Convention may mean that he has technically speaking forfeited his right t raise this issue as a Vienna Convention claim, on appeal that failure would not bar hi from independently asserting a claim that he was prejudiced because he lacked this critical protection needed for a fair trial .î (Emphasis added.)
The crucial point in this situation is that, by the operation of the procedural default rule as it i applied at present, the defendant is effectively barred from raising the issue of the violation of hi rights under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention and is limited to seeking the vindication of hi rights under the United States Constitution.
135. Mexico, in the latter part of its seventh submission, has stated that ìthis obligation [o providing review and reconsideration] cannot be satisfied by means of clemency proceedingsî.
Mexico elaborates this point by arguing first of all that ìthe United States’s reliance on clemenc proceedings is wholly inconsistent with its obligation to provide a remedy, as that obligation wa found by this Court in LaGrand î. More specifically, Mexico contends:
ì First , it is clear that the Court’s direction to the United States in LaGrand clearly contemplated that ëreview and reconsideration’ would be carried out b judicial procedures . . .
Second , the Court was fully aware that the LaGrand brothers had received clemency hearing, during which the Arizona Pardons Board took into account th violation of their consular rights. Accordingly, the Court determined in LaGrand tha clemency review alone did not constitute the required ëreview and reconsideration’ . . .
Finally , the Court specified that the United States must ëallow the review an reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking account of the violation o the rights set forth in the Convention’ . . . it is a basic matter of U.S. crimina procedural law that courts review convictions; clemency panels do not. With the rar exception of pardons based on actual innocence, the focus of capital clemency revie is on the propriety of the sentence and not on the underlying conviction. Furthermore, Mexico argues that the clemency process is in itself an ineffective remedy to satisf the international obligations of the United States. It concludes: ìclemency review is standardless secretive, and immune from judicial oversightî.
Finally, in support of its contention, Mexico argues tha ìthe failure of state clemency authorities to pay heed to the intervention of th U.S. Department of State in cases of death-sentenced Mexican nationals refutes th [United States] contention that clemency review will provide meaningfu consideration of the violations of rights conferred under Article 36î.
136. Against this contention of Mexico, the United States claims that it ìgives ëfull effect’ t the ëpurposes for which the rights accorded under [Article 36, paragraph 1,] are intended’ throug executive clemencyî. It argues that ì[t]he clemency process . . . is well suited to the task o providing review and reconsiderationî. The United States explains that ìClemency . . . is mor than a matter of grace; it is part of the overall scheme for ensuring justice and fairness in the lega processî and that ìClemency procedures are an integral part of the existing ëlaws and regulations of the United States through which errors are addressedî.
137. Specifically in the context of the present case, the United States contends that th following two points are particularly noteworthy:
ìFirst, these clemency procedures allow for broad participation by advocates o clemency, including an inmate’s attorney and the sending state’s consular officer . . .
Second, these clemency officials are not bound by principles of procedural default finality, prejudice standards, or any other limitations on judicial review. They ma consider any facts and circumstances that they deem appropriate and relevant including specifically Vienna Convention claimsî.
138. The Court would emphasize that the ìreview and reconsiderationî prescribed by it i the LaGrand case should be effective. Thus it should ìtak[e] account of the violation of the right set forth in [the] Conventionî ( I.C.J. Reports 2001 , p. 516, para. 128 (7)) and guarantee that th violation and the possible prejudice caused by that violation will be fully examined and taken int account in the review and reconsideration process. Lastly, review and reconsideration should b both of the sentence and of the conviction.
139. Accordingly, in a situation of the violation of rights under Article 36, paragraph 1, o the Vienna Convention, the defendant raises his claim in this respect not as a case of ìharm to particular right essential to a fair trialî . a concept relevant to the enjoyment of due process right under the United States Constitution . but as a case involving the infringement of his rights unde Article 36, paragraph 1. The rights guaranteed under the Vienna Convention are treaty right which the United States has undertaken to comply with in relation to the individual concerned irrespective of the due process rights under United States constitutional law. In this regard, th Court would point out that what is crucial in the review and reconsideration process is the existenc of a procedure which guarantees that full weight is given to the violation of the rights set forth i the Vienna Convention, whatever may be the actual outcome of such review and reconsideration.
140. As has been explained in paragraphs 128 to 134 above, the Court is of the view that, i cases where the breach of the individual rights of Mexican nationals under Article 36 paragraph 1 (b) , of the Convention has resulted, in the sequence of judicial proceedings that has
followed, in the individuals concerned being subjected to prolonged detention or convicted an sentenced to severe penalties, the legal consequences of this breach have to be examined and take into account in the course of review and reconsideration. The Court considers that it is the judicia process that is suited to this task.
141. The Court in the LaGrand case left to the United States the choice of means as to ho review and reconsideration should be achieved, especially in the light of the procedural defaul rule. Nevertheless, the premise on which the Court proceeded in that case was that the process o review and reconsideration should occur within the overall judicial proceedings relating to th individual defendant concerned.
142. As regards the clemency procedure, the Court notes that this performs an importan function in the administration of criminal justice in the United States and is ìthe historic remedy fo preventing miscarriages of justice where judicial process has been exhaustedî ( Herrera v. Collins 506 U.S. 390 (1993) at pp. 411-412). The Court accepts that executive clemency, while no judicial, is an integral part of the overall scheme for ensuring justice and fairness in the lega process within the United States criminal justice system. It must, however, point out that what is a issue in the present case is not whether executive clemency as an institution is or is not an integra part of the ìexisting laws and regulations of the United Statesî, but whether the clemency proces as practised within the criminal justice systems of different states in the United States can, in and o itself, qualify as an appropriate means for undertaking the effective ìreview and reconsideration o the conviction and sentence by taking account of the violation of the rights set forth in th Conventionî, as the Court prescribed in the LaGrand Judgment ( I.C.J. Reports 2001 , p. 514 para. 125).
143. It may be true, as the United States argues, that in a number of cases ìclemency in fac results in pardons of convictions as well as commutations of sentencesî. In that sense and to tha extent, it might be argued that the facts demonstrated by the United States testify to a degree o effectiveness of the clemency procedures as a means of relieving defendants on death row fro execution. The Court notes, however, that the clemency process, as currently practised within th United States criminal justice system, does not appear to meet the requirements described i paragraph 138 above and that it is therefore not sufficient in itself to serve as an appropriate mean of ìreview and reconsiderationî as envisaged by the Court in the LaGrand case. The Cour considers nevertheless that appropriate clemency procedures can supplement judicial review an reconsideration, in particular where the judicial system has failed to take due account of th violation of the rights set forth in the Vienna Convention, as has occurred in the case of the thre Mexican nationals referred to in paragraph 114 above.
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144. Finally, the Court will consider the eighth submission of Mexico, in which it asks th Court to adjudge and declare:
ìThat the [United States] shall cease its violations of Article 36 of the Vienn Convention with regard to Mexico and its 52 nationals and shall provide appropriat guarantees and assurances that it shall take measures sufficient to achieve increase compliance with Article 36 (1) and to ensure compliance with Article 36 (2). 145. In this respect, Mexico recognizes the efforts by the United States to raise awareness o consular assistance rights, through the distribution of pamphlets and pocket cards and by th conduct of training programmes, and that the measures adopted by the United States to that en were noted by the Court in its decision in the LaGrand case ( I.C.J. Reports 2001 , pp. 511-513 paras. 121, 123-124). Mexico, however, notes with regret that ìthe United States program whatever its components, has proven ineffective to prevent the regular and continuing violation b its competent authorities of consular notification and assistance rights guaranteed by Article 36î.
146. In particular, Mexico claims in relation to the violation of the obligations unde Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention:
ì First , competent authorities of the United States regularly fail to provide th timely notification required by Article 36(1)(b) and thereby to [sic] frustrate th communication and access contemplated by Article 36(1)(a) and the assistanc contemplated by Article 36(1)(c). These violations continue notwithstanding th Court’s judgment in LaGrand and the program described there.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mexico has demonstrated, moreover, that the pattern of regular noncomplianc continues. During the first half of 2003, Mexico has identified at least one hundre cases in which Mexican nationals have been arrested by competent authorities of th United States for serious felonies but not timely notified of their consular notificatio rights. Furthermore, in relation to the violation of the obligations under Article 36, paragraph 2, o the Vienna Convention, Mexico claims:
ì Second , courts in the United States continue to apply doctrines of procedura default and non-retroactivity that prevent those courts from reaching the merits o Vienna Convention claims, and those courts that have addressed the merits of thos claims (because no procedural bar applies) have repeatedly held that no remedy i available for a breach of the obligations of Article 36 . . . Likewise, the United States’
reliance on clemency proceedings to meet LaGrand ’s requirement of review an reconsideration represents a deliberate decision to allow these legal rules and doctrine to continue to have their inevitable effect. Hence, the United States continues t breach Article 36(2) by failing to give full effect to the purposes for which the right accorded under Article 36 are intended. 147. The United States contradicts this contention of Mexico by claiming that ìits efforts t improve the conveyance of information about consular notification are continuing unabated and ar achieving tangible resultsî. It contends that Mexico ìfails to establish a ëregular and continuing pattern of breaches of Article 36 in the wake of LaGrand î.
148. Mexico emphasizes the necessity of requiring the cessation of the wrongful act because, it alleges, the violation of Article 36 with regard to Mexico and its 52 nationals stil continues. The Court considers, however, that Mexico has not established a continuing violation o Article 36 of the Vienna Convention with respect to the 52 individuals referred to in its fina submissions; it cannot therefore uphold Mexico’s claim seeking cessation. The Court woul moreover point out that, inasmuch as these 52 individual cases are at various stages of crimina proceedings before the United States courts, they are in the state of pendente lite ; and the Cour has already indicated in respect of them what it regards as the appropriate remedy, namely revie and reconsideration by reference to the breach of the Vienna Convention.
149. The Mexican request for guarantees of non-repetition is based on its contention tha beyond these 52 cases there is a ìregular and continuingî pattern of breaches by the United State of Article 36. In this respect, the Court observes that there is no evidence properly before it tha would establish a general pattern. While it is a matter of concern that, even in the wake of th LaGrand Judgment, there remain a substantial number of cases of failure to carry out the obligatio to furnish consular information to Mexican nationals, the Court notes that the United States ha been making considerable efforts to ensure that its law enforcement authorities provide consula information to every arrested person they know or have reason to believe is a foreign national.
Especially at the stage of pre-trial consular information, it is noteworthy that the United States ha been making good faith efforts to implement the obligations incumbent upon it under Article 36 paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention, through such measures as a new outreach programm launched in 1998, including the dissemination to federal, state and local authorities of the Stat Department booklet mentioned above in paragraph 63. The Court wishes to recall in this contex what it has said in paragraph 64 about efforts in some jurisdictions to provide the information unde Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , in parallel with the reading of the ìMiranda rightsî.
150. The Court would further note in this regard that in the LaGrand case Germany sought inter alia , ìa straightforward assurance that the United States will not repeat its unlawful acts ( I.C.J. Reports 2001 , p. 511, para. 120). With regard to this general demand for an assurance o non-repetition, the Court stated:
ìIf a State, in proceedings before this Court, repeatedly refers to substantia activities which it is carrying out in order to achieve compliance with certai obligations under a treaty, then this expresses a commitment to follow through wit the efforts in this regard. The programme in question certainly cannot provide a assurance that there will never again be a failure by the United States to observe th obligations of notification under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. But no Stat could give such a guarantee and Germany does not seek it. The Court considers tha the commitment expressed by the United States to ensure implementation of th specific measures adopted in performance of its obligations under Article 36 paragraph 1 (b) , must be regarded as meeting Germany’s request for a genera assurance of non-repetition.î ( I.C.J. Reports 2001 , pp. 512-513, para. 124. The Court believes that as far as the request of Mexico for guarantees and assurances o non-repetition is concerned, what the Court stated in this passage of the LaGrand Judgmen remains applicable, and therefore meets that request.
* 151. The Court would now re-emphasize a point of importance. In the present case, it ha had occasion to examine the obligations of the United States under Article 36 of the Vienn Convention in relation to Mexican nationals sentenced to death in the United States. Its findings a to the duty of review and reconsideration of convictions and sentences have been directed to th circumstance of severe penalties being imposed on foreign nationals who happen to be of Mexica nationality. To avoid any ambiguity, it should be made clear that, while what the Court has state concerns the Mexican nationals whose cases have been brought before it by Mexico, the Court ha been addressing the issues of principle raised in the course of the present proceedings from th viewpoint of the general application of the Vienna Convention, and there can be no question o making an a contrario argument in respect of any of the Court’s findings in the present Judgment.
In other words, the fact that in this case the Court’s ruling has concerned only Mexican national cannot be taken to imply that the conclusions reached by it in the present Judgment do not apply t other foreign nationals finding themselves in similar situations in the United States.
* *
152. By its Order of 5 February 2003 the Court, acting on a request by Mexico, indicated b way of provisional measure that ìThe United States of America shall take all measures necessary t ensure that Mr. CÈsar Roberto Fierro Reyna, Mr. Roberto Moreno Ramos and Mr. Osvald Torres Aguilera are not executed pending final judgment in these proceedingsî ( I.C.J. Reports 2003 , pp. 91-92, para. 59 (I)) (see paragraph 21 above). The Order of 5 February 2003, accordin to its terms and to Article 41 of the Statute, was effective pending final judgment, and th obligations of the United States in that respect are, with effect from the date of the presen Judgment, replaced by those declared in this Judgment. The Court has rejected Mexico’ submission that, by way of restitutio in integrum , the United States is obliged to annul th convictions and sentences of all of the Mexican nationals the subject of its claims (see above paragraphs 115-125). The Court has found that, in relation to these three persons (among others) the United States has committed breaches of its obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , of th Vienna Convention and Article 36, paragraphs 1 (a) and (c) , of that Convention; moreover, i respect of those three persons alone, the United States has also committed breaches of Article 36 paragraph 2, of the said Convention. The review and reconsideration of conviction and sentenc required by Article 36, paragraph 2, which is the appropriate remedy for breaches of Article 36 paragraph 1, has not been carried out. The Court considers that in these three cases it is for th United States to find an appropriate remedy having the nature of review and reconsideratio according to the criteria indicated in paragraphs 138 et seq. of the present Judgment.
* 153. For these reasons THE COURT (1) By thirteen votes to two Rejects the objection by the United Mexican States to the admissibility of the objection presented by the United States of America to the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility o the Mexican claims;
IN FAVOUR: President Shi; Vice-President Ranjeva; Judges Guillaume, Koroma Vereshchetin, Higgins, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal, Elaraby, Owada Tomka;
AGAINST: Judge Parra-Aranguren; Judge ad hoc Sep?lveda;
(2) Unanimously Rejects the four objections by the United States of America to the jurisdiction of the Court;
(3) Unanimously Rejects the five objections by the United States of America to the admissibility of the claim of the United Mexican States;
(4) By fourteen votes to one Finds that, by not informing, without delay upon their detention, the 51 Mexican national referred to in paragraph 106 (1) above of their rights under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , of th Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963, the United States of America breache the obligations incumbent upon it under that subparagraph;
IN FAVOUR: President Shi; Vice-President Ranjeva; Judges Guillaume, Koroma Vereshchetin, Higgins, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal, Elaraby, Owada Tomka; Judge ad hoc Sep?lveda;
AGAINST: Judge Parra-Aranguren;
(5) By fourteen votes to one Finds that, by not notifying the appropriate Mexican consular post without delay of th detention of the 49 Mexican nationals referred to in paragraph 106 (2) above and thereby deprivin the United Mexican States of the right, in a timely fashion, to render the assistance provided for b the Vienna Convention to the individuals concerned, the United States of America breached th obligations incumbent upon it under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) ;
IN FAVOUR: President Shi; Vice-President Ranjeva; Judges Guillaume, Koroma Vereshchetin, Higgins, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal, Elaraby, Owada Tomka; Judge ad hoc Sep?lveda;
AGAINST: Judge Parra-Aranguren;
(6) By fourteen votes to one Finds that, in relation to the 49 Mexican nationals referred to in paragraph 106 (3) above, th United States of America deprived the United Mexican States of the right, in a timely fashion, t communicate with and have access to those nationals and to visit them in detention, and thereb breached the obligations incumbent upon it under Article 36, paragraph 1 (a) and (c) , of th Convention;
IN FAVOUR: President Shi; Vice-President Ranjeva; Judges Guillaume, Koroma Vereshchetin, Higgins, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal, Elaraby, Owada Tomka; Judge ad hoc Sep?lveda;
AGAINST: Judge Parra-Aranguren;
(7) By fourteen votes to one Finds that, in relation to the 34 Mexican nationals referred to in paragraph 106 (4) above, th United States of America deprived the United Mexican States of the right, in a timely fashion, t arrange for legal representation of those nationals, and thereby breached the obligations incumben upon it under Article 36, paragraph 1 (c) , of the Convention;
IN FAVOUR: President Shi; Vice-President Ranjeva; Judges Guillaume, Koroma Vereshchetin, Higgins, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal, Elaraby, Owada Tomka; Judge ad hoc Sep?lveda;
AGAINST: Judge Parra-Aranguren;
(8) By fourteen votes to one Finds that, by not permitting the review and reconsideration, in the light of the rights se forth in the Convention, of the conviction and sentences of Mr. CÈsar Roberto Fierro Reyna Mr. Roberto Moreno Ramos and Mr. Osvaldo Torres Aguilera, after the violations referred to i subparagraph (4) above had been established in respect of those individuals, the United States o America breached the obligations incumbent upon it under Article 36, paragraph 2, of th Convention;
IN FAVOUR: President Shi; Vice-President Ranjeva; Judges Guillaume, Koroma Vereshchetin, Higgins, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal, Elaraby, Owada Tomka; Judge ad hoc Sep?lveda;
AGAINST: Judge Parra-Aranguren;
(9) By fourteen votes to one Finds that the appropriate reparation in this case consists in the obligation of the Unite States of America to provide, by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of th convictions and sentences of the Mexican nationals referred to in subparagraphs (4), (5), (6) and (7 above, by taking account both of the violation of the rights set forth in Article 36 of the Conventio and of paragraphs 138 to 141 of this Judgment;
IN FAVOUR: President Shi; Vice-President Ranjeva; Judges Guillaume, Koroma Vereshchetin, Higgins, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal, Elaraby, Owada Tomka; Judge ad hoc Sep?lveda;
AGAINST: Judge Parra-Aranguren;
(10) Unanimously Takes note of the commitment undertaken by the United States of America to ensur implementation of the specific measures adopted in performance of its obligations under Article 36 paragraph 1 (b) , of the Vienna Convention; and finds that this commitment must be regarded a meeting the request by the United Mexican States for guarantees and assurances of non-repetition;
(11) Unanimously Finds that, should Mexican nationals nonetheless be sentenced to severe penalties, withou their rights under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) , of the Convention having been respected, the Unite States of America shall provide, by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of th conviction and sentence, so as to allow full weight to be given to the violation of the rights set fort in the Convention, taking account of paragraphs 138 to 141 of this Judgment.
Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace The Hague, this thirty-first day of March, two thousand and four, in three copies, one of which wil be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the Unite Mexican States and the Government of the United States of America, respectively.
(Signed) SHI Jiuyong President.
(Signed) Philippe COUVREUR Registrar.
President SHI and Vice-President RANJEVA append declarations to the Judgment of th Court; Judges VERESHCHETIN, PARRA-ARANGUREN and TOMKA and Judge ad hoc SEP?LVED append separate opinions to the Judgment of the Court.
(Initialled) J.Y.S.
(Initialled) Ph.C.
